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THE INEVITABILITY OF A STRONG SEC
Robert A. Prenticet
There are many visions for the future of securities regulation. One
prominent view fratures significant private contracting for disclosure and
fraud protection. Another envisions regulatory competition, enabling compa-
nies to choose from among a menu of regulatory regimes provided by different
states, nations, or securities exchanges competing for incorporations or list-
ings. This article demonstrates that these two regulatory regimes rely too
heavily upon the reputational constraint, which is insufficient for the signifi-
cant task of securities regulation. Tenets of behavioral psychology suggest
that self-serving bias and other factors will too often cause managers to
choose regulatory regimes that serve their own best interests rather than those
of shareholders.
Around the globe, most developed economies have rejected private con-
tracting and regulatory competition in favor of emulating the United States'
current strong-SEC model. An impressive body of transnational empirical
evidence supports the viewpoint that the strong-SEC regulatory model is sig-
nificantly more effective than alternatives at promoting capital markets.
This article explains why the strong-SEC model best facilitates capital market
development and economic growth.
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INTRODUCTION
A familiar cycle has occurred in U.S. securities regulation over
the past few years: Loose regulation allows for scandal, which then
creates a political atmosphere supportive of aggressive regulation, fol-
lowed by a backlash by those regulated. This scenario in the 1920s
and 1930s led Congress to introduce the first federal securities laws.1
More recently, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(Sarbanes-Oxley) 2 in response to the Enron and related corporate
scandals 3 that resulted from a decade of an underfunded Securities
1 See, e.g., JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 1 (3d ed. 2005)
("The Securities and Exchange Commission was created at the conclusion of the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee's 1932-1934 investigation of stock exchange practices
..... ). The primary federal securities laws include the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (2000), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811
(2000). See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, A Historical Introduction to the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 329, 342-47 (1988).
2 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11,
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
3 See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2 (2002); H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at 18-19 (2002).
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and Exchange Commission (SEC) .4 Now the backlash has begun, as
many criticize the specifics of Sarbanes-Oxley, especially section 404's
provisions for internal financial controls and the Act's aggressive ex-
traterritorial application. 5 This paper does not take a position on the
specifics of Sarbanes-Oxley. Rather, it anticipates the broader, philo-
sophically based critiques that are on the horizon.
For serious students of securities regulation, the Enron scandal
and the Sarbanes-Oxley response raise an overarching question: What
should the future of securities regulation look like? Sarbanes-Oxley
embodies the "strong-SEC" model, which many people abhor for po-
litical and philosophical reasons. 6 Indeed, much brainpower has
been spent in the last few decades in a seemingly quixotic quest for a
preferable alternative to this strong-SEC model for securities
regulation.
7
The most persuasive alternative has been a regulatory competi-
tion model." Supporters argue that companies should be free to
choose from a menu of securities regulation options offered by the
fifty states,9 nations around the world, 10 and the world's stock ex-
changes.'1 These supporters assert that if managers can choose their
firm's regulatory environment, they will choose the level of regulation
most efficient for the purchasers and sellers of securities. 12 Implicitly,
4 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-969T, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON SEC's SPENDING AND STRATEGIC PLANNING EFFORTS 3
(2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03969t.pdf (reporting testimony of
RichardJ. Hillman, Dir., Fin. Markets and Cmty. Inv., before the Subcomm. on Gov't Effi-
ciency and Financial Mgmt., of the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform).
5 See, e.g., Dan Roberts, The Boardroom Burden: Calls for Reform Are Replaced by Concern
that Corporate Shake-Up Has Gone Too Far, FIN. TIMES, June 1, 2004, at 15 (noting that busi-
ness leaders believe that the pendulum has swung too far toward regulation and needs
recentering).
6 See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The Securities
and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 111
(2005).
7 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Privatization of Securities Laws: Proposals for Reform of Securi-
ties Regulation: An Overview, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 629, 629 (2001).
8 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms'Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46J. L.
& ECON. 383, 384 (2003) ("According to the view that appears to dominate the current
thinking of corporate law academics, state competition produces a 'race to the top' that
benefits shareholders. On this view, the desire to attract incorporations induces states to
develop and provide corporate arrangements that enhance shareholder value." (footnote
omitted)).
9 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECUR-
ITIES REGULATION (2002).
10 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 925-27 (1998).
11 See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 983-1000 (1999) (suggesting that
securities exchanges play the most prominent role in securities regulation).
12 See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation,
107 YALE LJ. 2359, 2366 (1998) ("Regulatory competition is desirable because when the
2006]
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this regulation may be little or none. Indeed, much less regulation
than currently exists is clearly the desired agenda of many of these
commentators. 13
Other commentators suggest that private contracting should re-
place government regulation. These commentators suggest both that
rational investors can bargain with securities sellers whose reputations
constrain them to act fairly and that the whole process needs neither
government intervention nor a legal backdrop other than contract
law. 14
In a recent paper, Frank Cross and I surveyed the relevant empiri-
cal literature and supplemented it with a study of our own. 15 That
empirical literature forms the basis for an extraordinarily strong argu-
ment that the strong-SEC model is much more effective than any ex-
isting competing model. The empirical evidence strongly indicates
that countries with mandatory disclosure, strong antifraud protec-
tions, insider trading prohibitions, and effective remedies in the form
of governmental and private rights of action tend both to have
stronger, more efficient capital markets and to enable companies to
raise capital more efficiently.
16
This Article surveys the nonempirical literature and argues that a
strong-SEC model is superior to other existing or proposed alterna-
tives. This Article also emphasizes that the realities of human greed
and short-sightedness on a grand scale have swamped deregulation's
dream of freeing issuers' managers and securities professionals from
any restraints other than those imposed by competition and
reputation.
It was reasonably clear before the Enron scandal, and is even
clearer now, that substantial federal government regulation of securi-
ties transactions in the United States will continue. When a crime
wave occurs, the answer is seldom fewer police. When a national mar-
ket crisis takes place, all players in the market and all governmental
actors look to Congress and the SEC for a solution.' 7 By enacting and
implementing Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress and the Commission could,
choice of investments includes variation in legal regimes, promoters of firms will find that
they can obtain a lower cost of capital by choosing the regime that investors prefer.").
13 See Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to Markets ?: A Political Economy of Issuer Choice in
International Securities Regulation, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 1363, 1367-68 (describing the free mar-
ket goals of regulatory competition advocates).
14 See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 279, 283 (2000).
15 Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, Economies, Capital Markets, and Securities
Law (2006) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
16 See id.
17 See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate
Federalism 12 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 23/2004,
2004; Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Bus., Econ. & Regulatory Policy, Research Paper No.
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and apparently did, restore confidence in the securities markets,1 8
similar to how the 1930s securities acts restored confidence following
the Great Crash of 1929.19
Part I of this Article reminds the reader that the short-term self-
interest of actors in the securities markets subverts the reputational
constraint, rendering it unlikely that capital markets can prosper with-
out stringent regulation. The discussion seeks to explain the inherent
shortcomings of the reputational constraint in a large-scale modern
market economy. Part II establishes the SEC's overall success during
606481 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=606481 ("When a problem with na-
tional market implications arises, all parties expect the national system to address it.").
18 See Dan Roberts, Corporate US Begins to Reflect, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at 7 ("If
investors-presumably still scarred by past scandals-are indeed a reliable guide to new-
found corporate responsibility, then the [post-Sarbanes-Oxley] improvement is easy to
measure: the S&P 500 is up 50 per cent since its 2002 low."); Bengt R. Holmstr6m & Steven
N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong? 22 (Euro-
pean Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=441100 ("At this point, [Sarbanes-Oxley] has probably helped to
restore confidence in the U.S. corporate governance system."). It is impossible to know
the role of Sarbanes-Oxley, but it is clear that during the dot-coin crash, stocks "never
reached the depths hit in other collapses, such as in the 1930s or the 1970s." E.S. Brown-
ing, Ah, the 1990s, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2004, at Cl.
19 Because investors in the 1930s did not yet know that federal regulation can and
does help restore stability to markets, it is not surprising that there is little conclusive evi-
dence that the 1930s securities acts restored confidence to the markets. In fact, Stephen
Choi and A.C. Pritchard argue that SEC regulation failed to restore confidence in the
markets, pointing to the fact that "the volume of trading remained below 1929 levels for
another three decades." Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the
SEC, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1, 31 n.151 (2003). However, some historians believe that SEC regu-
lation did have a salutary effect. See JONATHAN BARRON BASuN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A
HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 197 (1997) (noting that the 1930s securities acts "bol-
stered investor confidence by ensuring the greater transparency of corporate affairs"); SE-
LIGMAN, supra note 1, at 561-62 (observing that SEC regulation led to a dramatic increase
in investor participation in the markets).
Significantly, Choi and Pritchard chose the wrong benchmark for comparison; they
chose the insane heights of perhaps the greatest speculative bubble in American stock
market history-1929. The better method, of course, is to compare postregulation trading
volume with the levels of investor confidence in 1933 after the Great Crash. Not surpris-
ingly, the stock market crash of 1929 scared investors out of the stock market for quite a
long time, as it should have. See STEVE FRASER, EVERY MAN A SPECULATOR: A HISTORY OF
WALL STREET IN AMERICAN LIFE 479 (2005) (noting the "profound aftershock" of the Crash
"seared" memories into the public mind, and caused Americans to shun trading); JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 151-52 (Avon Books 1979 ed.) (1954) (noting that
stock market collapses, such as that of 1929, inoculate investors against speculative fever for
at least a time).
The ensuing Great Depression and World War II likely also discouraged investors
from returning to the securities markets. For "most people living then and for a long
generation after, the Crash and the Depression were joined at the hip." FRASER, supra, at
414. Even though automobile purchasers were not shell-shocked by the mendacity of their
market, as were securities investors, the impact of the Great Depression and World War II
meant that it took automobile sales nearly as long to recover (eight million cars were made
in 1929 and it was not until 1950 that sales reached that level again) as securities sales. See
Stephen Kindel, The Wrong Lesson, FORTUNE, July 18, 1983, at 44 (reporting auto sales).
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the past seventy years, explains that success, and notes that countries
around the world are currently emulating the strong-SEC model.
This Article does not address Sarbanes-Oxley in detail, but does
indicate the reasons why Sarbanes-Oxley's broad philosophy and some
of its most important prescriptions are consistent with evolving aca-
demic notions of best practices in securities regulation. This Article
also describes a growing worldwide consensus that the best way to cre-
ate and preserve efficient securities markets, a key to successful capi-
talism, is to have an effective central regulatory agency enforcing




Advocates of securities deregulation rely heavily upon the reputa-
tional incentive of company managers, securities professionals, and
market gatekeepers to maintain the integrity of the markets. Propo-
nents of deregulation assume away the problem that virtually all cor-
porate and securities law aims to minimize: the agency problem
identified by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means. 20 In the deregula-
tion worldview, investors, securities professionals, and ancillary actors
such as auditors and attorneys are rational. Furthermore, deregula-
tion assumes that these rational actors' concern for their long-term
reputations will constrain them from acting improperly, even without
regulation.
Similarly, those deregulation advocates who would replace the
SEC's mandatory requirements with the flexibility of regulatory com-
petition assume that managers of corporations will choose the optimal
securities regime for their firm. Thus, depending on what is in the
best interest of their shareholders, managers may choose the securi-
ties law of Delaware in a system of state regulatory competition, the
law of Chad in a regime of international regulatory competition, or
listing on the Deutsch Bourse in a scheme of exchange-based regula-
tory competition. Deregulation advocates further assume that manag-
ers will choose to subject the firm to stringent mandatory disclosure
requirements that decrease manager discretion, strong insider trading
rules that decrease manager profit opportunities, and punitive an-
tifraud civil and criminal punishments that increase manager liability
exposure. These assumptions ignore the record of the past decade.
They allow the fox to choose the rules that will govern the henhouse.
20 See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933).
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While it may seem unnecessary and even trite to recount the de-
tails of recent frauds, memories are short, and many people cling to
overly optimistic views about the tensile strength of the reputational
constraint. As with reports of violent crimes in Detroit or civilian
deaths in Iraq, frequently repeated information eventually loses its im-
pact. Thus, a brief summary of the recent scandals is worth recount-
ing to remind us one more time that we should not become too
hardened to the evidence of grand-scale agency problems that cannot
be assumed away.
A. The Firm and Its Principals
1. Issuing Companies: Earnings Management and Earnings Fraud
A company can benefit when it develops a reputation for disclos-
ing accurate information to investors. In theory, then, we should not
need an SEC to enforce voluntary, accurate disclosure. Corporate
practices of the last decade or so, however, stand in marked contrast
to economic theory. The $6 trillion collapse in stock wealth when the
dot-coin bubble burst makes this point clear.21 The first shock came
when it became clear that Enron had used smoke, mirrors, and a pha-
lanx of special purpose entities to make itself appear to be the seventh
largest company in the country; its investors lost $70 billion.22 A flurry
of subsequent revelations followed. HealthSouth overstated its earn-
ings by $4.6 billion.2 3 Adelphia hid more than $2 billion in debt.24
Not to be outdone, WorldCom inflated its earnings by $11 billion 25
and wiped out nearly $180 billion in shareholder wealth when fraud
disclosures collapsed its stock.26 Global Crossing collapsed under
$12.4 billion in debt after revealing that it had inappropriately re-
ported its revenue.
27
These instances represent only a sampling of such cases. Ten
percent of all publicly listed companies restated earnings because of
accounting irregularities between 1997 and June 2002.28 Write-offs
"in excess of $148 billion erased virtually all of the profits reported by
21 James Toedtman, Securities Law Tested, NEWSDAY, July 27, 2003, at A43.
22 William M. Sinnett, Are There Good Reasons for Auditor Rotation?, FIN. EXEC., Oct.
2004, at 29, 32 (quoting Dr. Robert A. Howell of Dartmouth).
23 Shawn Young, MCI to State Fraud Was $11 Billion, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2004, at A3.
24 Mark Hamblett, Adelphia Fraud Case Allowed to Proceed, N.Y.LJ., Aug. 12, 2003, at 1
(noting false filings with the SEC from 1999 to 2002).
25 See Young, supra note 23.
26 WorldCom Agrees to Pay Record $500M to Settle SEC Civil Fraud Charges, SEc. LiTiG. &
REG. REP., June 4, 2003, at 6.
27 Gretchen Morgenson, Global Crossing Settles Suit on Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004,
at C1.
. 28 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-138, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS:




Nasdaq companies between 1995 and 2000."29 In 2004, companies
filed a record 414 restatements, many of which covered multiyear
periods. 30
Moreover, these restatements were only a part of the larger prob-
lem. For instance, IBM, Microsoft, PepsiCo, and other companies
misled investors but managed corporate earnings in such a way as to
avoid restatements.3 1 Academic studies show that in addition to the
blatant examples of earnings management, a much larger percentage
of companies stretched to barely meet or top their previous quarter's
earnings rather than fall short of the previous benchmark.
3 2
Thus, although companies can benefit from a reputation for pro-
viding timely, accurate disclosures, the reputational constraint has
proven inadequate even in the shadow of substantial securities regula-
tion. Empirical evidence indicates "that there are long-term benefits
to building reputations for providing reliable and timely disclosures.
Yet the sample of firms investigated in [the] study chose to risk (and
ultimately lose) these benefits for the prospect of short-term gain."
33
Given this backdrop, one shudders at how bad things would have
been without federal regulation.
2. CEOs
Corporate managers are primarily responsible for earnings man-
agement and accounting frauds.3 4 CEOs and other top managers the-
oretically run their companies in the best interests of the
shareholders. Short-term greed, a false sense of entitlement, or some
other psychological malady must account, then, for recent evidence
that CEOs too often run their companies primarily to feather their
own nests. Why else did the pay of Fortune 500 companies' CEOs rise
29 Eugene Spector, Fraud MadeEasy, NAT'L. L.J., Sept. 23, 2002, at A17; see also Charles
Handy, What's Business For?, HARv. Bus. REv., Dec. 2002, at 49, 49 ("John May, a stock
analyst for a U.S. investment service, pointed out that the pro forma earnings announce-
ments by the top 100 NASDAQ companies in the first nine months of 2001 overstated
actual audited profits by $100 billion.").
30 Jonathan D. Glater, Restatements Are at a High, and Lawsuits Are Rising, N. Y. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 2005, at C2 (citing Huron Consulting Group study); Carrie Johnson, Restatements
Up 28 Percent in 2004, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2005, at E4 (same).
31 See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND ITS UNDO-
INc 62 (2004).
32 See id. (citing Francois Degeorge et al., Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds, 72
J. Bus. 1 (1999)).
33 See Patricia M. Dechow et al., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An
Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. Accr. REs. 1, 31 (1996)
(citation omitted).
34 See Tom Horton, Tone at the Top: There Is Nothing More Important for the Board to Care
About, and to Assess, DREcTORs & BOARDS, June 22, 2002, at 8 (citing study by the Commit-
tee of Sponsoring Organizations finding that of 200 cases of alleged financial fraud investi-
gated by the SEC from 1987 to 1997, five out of six involved either the CEO, the CFO, or
both colluding in the fraud).
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from forty times that of the average worker in 1980 to 530 times
higher in 2003?3 5 Why does CEO compensation now average 7.89%
of corporate profits and 17.19% of dividends?36 Never before have
top officers taken so large a piece of the corporate pie.37 As Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board Chief William McDonough has
noted, "There is no economic theory on God's planet that can justify
[current executive pay levels]."38
The huge pay increase derives primarily from the stock option
craze of the 1990s, which is, in turn, traceable to an article by econo-
mists Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy, who argued that "it's not
how much you pay, but how."39 The theory underlying options-based
compensation was to motivate CEOs and other managers to work hard
by allowing them to share in their firms' success, at least insofar as that
success is reflected in stock price. Unfortunately, as implemented,
stock options generally decoupled pay from performance and usually
protected the executives from downside risk.40 Even Jensen and Mur-
phy now admit that "many of the corporate scandals [of 2001 and
2002] were driven, in large part, by executives desperately trying to
justify or increase short-run stock prices at the expense of long-run
value creation."
4 1
CEO pay has been described as the "mad-cow disease of Ameri-
can boardrooms."4 2 As Frank Partnoy notes:
[E]conomists had long argued that corporate executives would
never systematically take advantage of investors, because their repu-
tations would be destroyed if they did....
It became clear during the 1990s that this argument, although
perhaps sound in theory, was wrong in practice. CEOs manipulated
their companies' earnings, paid themselves huge amounts of op-
35 See, e.g., Joseph T. Hallinan, It Still Pays to Be a Conseco CEO, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17,
2004, at Cl.
36 STEVEN BALSAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 262, 264 (2002).
37 See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Puzzle of Corporate Law 31
(George Washington Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 55,
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=363480.
38 Hallinan, supra note 35.
39 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay,
But How, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 138.
40 See Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions-Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for
Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 271, 274 (1999) ("Compared to other shareholders,
performance-based pay seems to make corporate executives a privileged class that does not
have to pay for its stock and is largely protected from downside risk").
41 Michael C. Jensen et al., Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What are
the Problems, and How to Fix Them 18 (Harvard NOM, Working Paper No. 04-28, 2004; Euro-
pean Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305.
42 John A. Byrne et al., How to Fix Corporate Governance, Bus. WIL, May 6, 2002, at 68, 71




tions, and established cozy relationships with their accountants and
securities analysts, but they did not acquire bad reputations-at
least not until several years later.
4 3
3. Boards of Directors
In theory, public company directors monitor managers on behalf
of passive shareholders. However, "directors who do not direct" have
long been a problem.4 4 Sometimes directors remain passive out of
self-interest. Empirical evidence indicates that high director compen-
sation corresponds with high CEO pay.4 5 "Timing opportunism"-
the tendency of companies to bestow stock options upon officers im-
mediately before good news is disclosed or after bad news is dis-
closed-is not only widespread and increasing, but also more
common in companies in which directors receive a larger proportion
of their pay in the form of options.46 Jensen and Murphy admit that
executive compensation contracts in American public corporations
"have become so extreme and so abusive that they call into question
the integrity of important parts of the remuneration process and the
fiduciary responsibilities of boards and remuneration committees."
47
In addition to economic incentives, social, behavioral, and psy-
chological factors encourage directors to subordinate shareholder in-
terests. 48 These include friendships with and loyalty to the CEO,
49
collegiality and team spirit that discourage asking the hard ques-
tions,50 deference to the CEO's authority,5 1 and the directors' desire
43 FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINAN-
CIAL MARKETS 188-89 (2003). When officers were controlling shareholders, things could
get even worse, as in the Hollinger International, Inc. case, in which controlling sharehold-
ers looted $400 million. See Hollinger Inc. Says S.E.C. May Bring a Civil Lawsuit Against It,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2004, at C2.
44 See William 0. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1305 (1934).
45 See Ivan E. Brick et al., CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Firm Perform-
ance, J. CORP. FIN. (forthcoming 2006).
46 See Gretchen Morgenson, Are Options Seducing Directors, Too?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2004, at BUl.
47 Jensen et al., supra note 41, at 29.
48 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 31-34 (2004).
49 See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95
HARv. L. REV. 597, 613 (1982); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavi-
orial Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 673, 726-27
(2005).
50 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 48, at 32.
51 People have a natural tendency to defer to those they perceive to be in positions of
authority. See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 371 (1963).
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not to monitor others more strictly than they would like to be moni-
tored themselves.
52
Eugene Fama and Jensen suggest that the reputational constraint
should sufficiently induce independent directors to do theirjob prop-
erly,53 but experience indicates otherwise. A more realistic assess-
ment, in light of the facts, is that directors' reputational constraints
are pretty loose.54 Even if directors vote for extremely high pay for
executives or themselves, they likely will suffer little reputational dam-
age unless they go so far that the shareholder "outrage" factor is
triggered.
55
The long-term impact of Sarbanes-Oxley's reforms is still un-
known.56 Reputational sanctions always have more bite, however,
when it is clear that conduct violates legal standards.
57
B. The Gatekeepers
If issuing companies engage in financial shenanigans driven by
their managers and unconstrained by their directors, outside gate-
keepers including auditors, attorneys, stockbrokers, and stock analysts
are the next place to look for investor protection. They are, however,
too often inadequate for such a task.
1. Auditors
Auditors are the primary gatekeepers for investors in public com-
panies. Such investors reasonably assume that the financial statements
filed by public companies fairly represent the financial condition of
those companies.58 Many suggest that because of the reputational
52 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda
for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863, 875 (1991).
53 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26J.L.
& ECON. 301 (1983).
54 See BEBCHUK & FIaED, supra note 48, at 36.
55 See id.
56 The short-term signs are good. For example, since Sarbanes-Oxley's promulgation,
public company boards are spending more time on their duties. See Brian Louis, Stiffer
Boards: Corporate Scandals Have Prompted Rule Changes that Have Put More Work in the Laps of
Directors, WINSTON-SALEM J.,Jan. 2, 2005, at 1 (noting the 75% increase in the frequency of
audit committee meetings). They are meeting more often without the CEO present. See
Lina Saigol, Fewer Willing to Take Director Risk, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at 22 (noting that
the percentage of boards holding sessions without the CEO's presence had risen from 41%
in 2002 to 93% in 2003).
57 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors'Fiduciary Duty
Through Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L. REv. 393, 446-47 (2005) ("In fact, it was not until our
legal and political system openly condemned Enron officials that their reputations began
to suffer.").
58 Enron's shareholders certainly relied at least partially on Arthur Andersen. See, e.g.,
Stephen L. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for Securi-
ties Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 273 (2003).
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constraint, it would be irrational for auditors to act improperly.59 Yet
empirical evidence indicates that when treatment of a transaction is
less than certain, accountants often succumb to their clients' wishes,
even when those wishes contradict the auditors' best judgment, and
even in settings in which the auditors could build a reputation for
reliability. 6
0
Thirty years of accounting research using the tenets of behavioral
psychology and related fields demonstrates that auditors scarcely re-
semble the "Chicago man,"61 the model of the law and economics
literature who is thought to rationally protect his reputation by acting
in an upstanding fashion. Instead, the literature shows that decision-
making biases and heuristics easily precipitate audit failures by caus-
ing auditors to act in a less than fully rational fashion. 62 It also may be
rational, in the short term, for individual accountants to disregard
their clients' fraud in order to cultivate client relationships critical to
their careers. 63 Reputational constraints fail to restrain large account-
ing firms, both because large firms have a huge competitive advantage
over second-tier firms that is difficult to squander and because as a
group, large firms are lumped together such that one firm does not
profit much from behaving better than its competitors.
64
Substantial evidence indicates that the accounting scandals of the
past few years resulted partly because consulting fees were just too
easy to sell to audit clients, and no accounting firm could comfortably
displease its clients by being a stickler about accounting rules with so
much consulting money at risk. Consulting fees rose from seventeen
percent of audit fees in 1990 to sixty-seven percent in 1999.65 Studies
also show that the firms that bought more consulting services were
59 See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook,
J.).
60 See Brian W. Mayhew et al., The Effect of Accounting Uncertainty and Auditor Reputation
on Auditor Objectivity, 20 AUDITING, Sept. 2001, at 49, 66.
61 Cf Daniel McFadden, Rationality for Economists?, 19 J. RIsK & UNCERTAINTY 73, 76
(1999) ("However, there is overwhelming behavior evidence against a literal interpretation
of Chicago man as a universal model of choice behavior.").
62 See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into
Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 133, 139-81 (2000).
63 See id. at 187-89.
64 See Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An
Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 263, 297-98 (2004) (finding no major distinctions among the Big Six in terms of
quality); cf Rajib Doogar et al., The Impairment of Auditor Credibility: Stock Market Evi-
dence from the Enron-Andersen Saga (December 2003) (unnumbered working paper),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=479941 (finding "auditor credibility spillovers" in
that the emerging news of Arthur Andersen shredding documents hurt the reputation of
all large auditors).
65 PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 112 (2000), availa-
ble at http://www.pobauditpanel.org/downloads/chapter5.pdf.
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more likely to fit the profile of firms that engaged in earnings
management.66
The Enron-Arthur Andersen scandal devastated the theory of
reputational constraint of auditors.67 Even Larry Ribstein, generally a
strong opponent of aggressive regulation, recognizes the necessity of
drastic reform because "auditing firms have proven willing to cast
aside valuable reputations for short-term profits. Notably, a $7 million
fine levied against Arthur Andersen because of its mishandling of
Waste Management a few months before the Enron scandal broke did
not provoke Arthur Andersen to significantly change its ways."
68
2. Attorneys
In theory, the reputational constraint also applies to attorneys. In
reality, the restraint is not sufficient. Indeed, Donald Langevoort sus-
pects that many clients are drawn to attorneys who have a reputation
for helping clients pull shenanigans. 69 Evidence shows that during
the 1990s many attorneys were more "aiders and abettors" of client
fraud than gatekeepers against it.7
For example, Enron was the largest client of Vinson & Elkins, pay-
ing fees of $35 million a year. 71 Vinson & Elkins's attorneys, who were
up to their elbows in structuring questionable deals, 72 did not listen to
warnings about those deals. Instead, they found ways for Enron to
avoid disclosing incriminating information. 73 When they did question
Enron CFO Andy Fastow, he rebuffed them, and the lawyers never
went to the board with their concerns.74 Financial columnist Roger
66 See Richard M. Frankel et al., The Relation Between Auditors'Fees for Non-Audit Services
and Earnings Management, 77 Acr. REV. (Supp.) 71, 89 (2002).
67 See Choi & Fisch, supra note 58, at 293-94.
68 Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 30 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
69 See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers'
Responsibility for Clients'Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REv. 75, 112 (1993).
70 SeeJonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate
Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329,
353-54 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., Proposed Sec. 307 Rules, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 2, 2002, at B8.
71 BETHANY McLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING
RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 357 (2003).
72 See id. at 305 (noting that many of Enron's most questionable deals were the prod-
uct of brainstorming among its employees, Arthur Andersen accountants, and Vinson &
Elkins attorneys).
73 See id. at 328 (explaining how Vinson & Elkins attorneys helped Enron attorneys
find loopholes for not disclosing Fastow's compensation for running Enron's special pur-
pose entities).
74 Ellen Joan Pollock, Lawyers for Enron Faulted Its Deals, Didn't Force Issue, WALL ST. J.,
May 22, 2002, at Al ("Vinson & Elkins lawyers sometimes objected, saying the deals posed
conflicts of interest or weren't in Enron's best interests. But Vinson & Elkins didn't blow
the whistle. Again and again, its lawyers backed down when rebuffed by Mr. Fastow or his
lieutenants, expressing their unease to Enron's in-house attorneys but not to its most se-
nior executives or to its board.").
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Lowenstein was largely right when he concluded that attorneys for
firms such as Enron "were less professionals than mercenaries," and
that "[t]he long hours these professionals for hire spent with execu-
tives, and also the professionals' more-than-ample fees, forged an
identity of interest, a society of mutual co-conspiracy. ''75
The same self-serving bias that colors auditors' judgments affects
attorneys as well. 76 No attorney believes disbarment or civil liability
for securities fraud is in her long-term interest, but overconfidence,
undue optimism, the illusion of control, and related decision-making
errors can cause attorneys to jeopardize their long-term reputational
interest by taking unwise risks. When it comes to attorney misbehav-
ior, "[r]eputation . . is not a cure-all.
77
3. Stockbrokers
Most stock brokerage advertising stresses reputation, yet the se-
curities industry is a "bundle of conflicts of interest"78 that constantly
endangers the reputational constraint. Stockbrokers make money by
inducing clients to engage in transactions that will generate commis-
sions, though a "buy and hold" strategy is more profitable. 79 These
stockbrokers often work for Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup,
or other firms. These firms also have investment banking arms that
seek to sell their issuer clients' stocks high, though stockbrokers osten-
sibly work to help investor clients buy the stock low.80
75 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 31, at 162.
76 See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 145-53 (1993) (noting that in one set of experiments,
law students were given basic information about a tort case and asked to play the role of
counsel for the plaintiff or defendant while negotiating a settlement; in the short time it
took to read the packet, students began to identify with their assigned roles, which substan-
tially biased their judgments as to what would constitute a fair settlement).
77 Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Law-
yers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 410 (1997) (addressing the
motivations of attorneys).
78 Robert Kuttner, The Big Board: Cying Out for Regulation, Bus. WK., Oct. 13, 2003, at
26, 26.
79 See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, All that Glitters: The Effect of Attention
and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors 25 (Jan. 2005)
(unnumbered working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=460660 ("Previous
work has shown that most investors do not benefit from active trading. On average, the
stocks they buy subsequently underperform those they sell and the most active traders
underperform those who trade less. The attention-based buying patterns we document
here do not generate superior returns. We believe that most investors will benefit from a
strategy of buying and holding a well-diversified portfolio. Investors who insist on hunting
for the next brilliant stock would be well advised to remember what California prospectors
discovered ages ago: All that glitters is not gold." (internal citations omitted)).
80 SeeJames Surowiecki, In Wall Street We Trust, NEW YORKER, May 26, 2003, at 40 (ex-
plaining the conflict and noting that various cognitive biases lead many investors to stay
with their brokers even after evidence emerges that the brokers have been involved in
fraud).
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While one may fault investors for not being sufficiently wary,
courts have properly held that "[t]hough the law of fraud does not
endorse a hear no evil, see no evil approach, neither does it require
that an aggrieved party ... proceed[ ] from the outset as if he were
dealing with thieves." 81 Yet in recent years, rampant fraud has victim-
ized those investors who did not proceed in this manner.
In the past few years, violations have been widespread. In 2003,
investors filed nearly 9,000 arbitration claims with the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers (NASD).82 Moreover, the NASD itself,
which does not have a reputation as a particularly vigorous enforcer of
its own standards,83 filed 1,352 enforcement actions against its mem-
bers.84 This evidence strongly indicates- that the reputational con-
straint is insufficient to properly minimize broker misconduct.85
There are many behavioral reasons that explain this phenomenon. 86
Among the most important, however, are the facts that most brokers
are under high pressure to produce results in the short term and that
they know they are unlikely to be in the business in the long term.
87
4. Securities Analysts
Opponents of strong securities regulation often contend that, al-
though there may have been a time of rampant fraud and no disclo-
sure, the high level of sophistication of institutional investors who
dominate the market today renders regulation unnecessary. 88 Sophis-
ticated investors can protect themselves (and, indirectly, other inves-
tors) by demanding efficient disclosure and suitable antifraud
incentives. The securities professional's rational interest in protecting
81 Hudak v. Econ. Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1974).
82 Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n Sec. Dealers (NASD), NASD: 2003 in Review (Dec. 30,
2003), available at http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?dcService=SSGETPAGE&ssDoc
Name=NASDW_002808. The NASD handles approximately ninety percent of securities ar-
bitration claims. Ben White, NASD Sees Arbitration Problems: Letter Rebukes Firms for Document
Delays, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2003, at El.
83 See S.E.C. Proposes N.A.S.D. Censure to Settle Rules Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,June 19, 1996, at
D3 (noting NASD failings and SEC pressure for improvement).
84 Press Release, NASD, supra note 82.
85 See Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regard-
ing Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1427, 1429-34 (2002) (providing six reasons
why the reputational constraint is inadequate, especially noting that "the reputational con-
straint is often insufficient to prompt managers and issuers to disclose optimal amounts of
accurate information to investors").
86 See id. at 1426-34.
87 See PETER D. SPENCER, THE STRUCTURE AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 33
(2000) ("[I]n financial industries, short-term incentives to cheat or defraud are typically
high compared to long-term incentives to remain in the industry.").
88 See BENJAMIN MARK CoLE, THE PIED PIPERS OF WALL STREET: How ANALYSTS SELL
You DOWN THE RIVER 120-21 (2001) (quoting two portfolio managers as not worried that




her long-term reputational capital theoretically will provide sufficient
protection from abuse, thereby rendering governmental regulation
unnecessary. 8
9
Securities analysts provide a small, slightly impure laboratory ex-
periment for this theory. For various reasons, courts and commenta-
tors were hostile to SEC regulation of securities analysts,90 who
remained relatively unregulated until recently.91 Theoretically, a ra-
tional securities analyst would burnish her reputation by arranging to
be compensated only by the quality of her picks, disclosing the
method of her compensation, and swearing that she truly believed in
her ratings. Sophisticated investors theoretically would demand these
measures. The unregulated market, however, did not function in that
manner.
Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, the law and many investors assumed that
analysts were reasonably objective researchers, while they were actually
financially "beholden to their employers and their [employers'] larg-
est clients."92 Perhaps once upon a time securities analysts recom-
mended only stocks they believed in and did, by dint of diligent
research, uncover financial frauds.93 Before Congress passed
Sarbanes-Oxley, however, the chasm between investor perception of
the stock analysts' role and their actual practice was alarmingly wide.
The system of compensating analysts not on the accuracy of their calls
but on how much investment banking business they could generate by
flacking for potential clients contributed mightily to the existence of
such a gulf.
9 4
Although sophisticated investors recognized the potential conflict
of interest, they likely believed that analysts would not totally prosti-
tute themselves in order to gain investment banking business for their
firms.95 The investors were wrong. For example, at least some ana-
lysts, many working for investment banks seeking Enron's underwrit-
ing business, "ignored serious indications of financial problems and
89 See id.
90 See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983) (recognizing value of analysts
and rejecting an SEC attempt to punish an analyst for insider trading); Merritt B. Fox,
Regulation FD and Foreign Issuers: Globalization's Strains and Opportunities, 41 VA. J. INT'L. L.
653, 662 (2001) (noting that after commentators' criticism of a 1991 SEC action against a
CEO for selectively disclosing information to an analyst, the SEC stopped bringing such
actions).
91 SeeJill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regula-
tion of Analysts, 88 IowA L. REv. 1035, 1038 (2003) (noting that in spring 2002, the SEC
approved standards aimed at analyst disclosure and trading practices that were adopted by
the NYSE and NASD in response to Sarbanes-Oxley).
92 COLE, supra note 88, at xiii.
93 See PARTNov, supra note 43, at 285 ("Today, business journalists uncover most finan-
cial fraud; ten years ago, that was the job of securities analysts.").
94 Id. at 285-86.
95 See, e.g., COLE, supra note 88, at 120-21.
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continued to recommend Enron as an investment long after the com-
pany entered its death spiral.196 The inherent conflict of interest for
sell-side analysts helps explain such conduct. The analysts sought re-
wards based primarily on whether their recommendations allowed
their firms to obtain or retain investment banking business;97 mean-
while, firms did not base analyst salaries on accuracy.98 Because
"[a]nalysts were not rewarded for being right[,] . . . few tried to be."99
Academic studies fortify the colorful anecdotes about analysts
Jack Grubman and Henry Blodget. The studies indicate the following:
that analysts' recommendations are consistent with the interests of
their firms but not with the interests of investors who follow the rec-
ommendations, 100 that higher investment banking fees generally lead
to more positive analyst ratings, 01 that before Sarbanes-Oxley, ana-
lysts' professional rewards depended more on their being persistently
optimistic than their being accurate, 10 2 and that independent analysts
tend to be more accurate than analysts associated with investment
banks. 103
The presence of a few bad apples does not explain this pattern.
"Of 33,169 'buy,' 'sell' or 'hold' recommendations ... in 1999, only
125 [0.3%] were pure sells."'1 4 Alarmingly, "sixteen out of the seven-
teen securities analysts covering Enron maintained 'buy' or 'strong
buy' recommendations" right up until its bankruptcy; the only
96 - Choi & Fisch, supra note 58, at 273.
97 See id. ("Analyst reports are often influenced by a brokerage firm's desire to attract
or retain investment banking business."); Fisch & Sale, supra note 91, at 1039, 1040-56
(providing substantial evidence that analysts are "essentially salespeople, serving the inter-
ests of their firm's investment banking clients").
98 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 91, at 1052.
99 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 31, at 85.
100 Narasimhan Jegadeesh et al., Analyzing the Analysts: When Do Recommendations
Add Value? 3 (May 16, 2002) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=291241.
101 See Hsiou-wei Lin & Maureen F. McNichols, Underwriting Relationships, Analysts'
Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations, 25J. AccT. & ECON. 101, 124-25 (1998)
(finding that analysts' biased and overly optimistic investment recommendations regarding
their firms' clients' stocks are worse than unaffiliated analysts' recommendations); Patricia
M. Dechow et al., The Relation Between Analysts' Forecasts of Long-Term Earnings
Growth and Stock Price Performance Following Equity Offerings 3-4 (June 1999) (un-
numbered working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=168488 (finding that sell-
side analysts' forecasts are systematically overoptimistic regarding equity offerings due to
the positive relationship between fees paid to investment banks and analysts' optimism).
102 See Harrison Hong & Jeffrey D. Kubik, Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and
Biased Earnings Forecasts, 58J. FIN. 313, 341, 345-46 (2003).
103 See Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Under-
writer Analyst Recommendations, 12 REv. FIN. STUD. 653, 683 (1999).
104 COLE, supra note 88, at 97.
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holdout was the analyst for Prudential Securities, a firm which, not
coincidentally, did not then engage in investment banking. 1'
There is no way to overstate the greed, dishonesty, and treachery
of many securities analysts during the dot-com boom. Furthermore,
no evidence suggests that even the most sophisticated investors did or
could have adequately discounted share prices to account for this
treachery. The "brazenness of the conduct of the analysts" illustrates
the inadequacy of the reputational constraint.
10 6
5. Investment Banks
Securities analysts were only one part, albeit an important one, of
the overall problem with investment banks during the dot-coin
bust.10 7 The Glass-Steagall Act, which long separated investment
banking activities from those of commercial banking due to perceived
conflicts of interest, was repealed based on the assumption that invest-
ment bankers would not risk their long-term reputation by acting im-
prudently. t0 8 James Fanto makes the case, however, that many
investment banking employees, notjust securities analysts, psychologi-
cally became part of their clients' inner circle. 10 9 The investment
bankers then assisted their clients' financial shenanigans using special
purpose entities, fake assets sales, and the like. 110 In pursuing the
short-term lucre from such clients as Enron and WorldCom, invest-
105 John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301, 316 (2004).
106 Thad A. Davis, A New Model of Securities Law Enforcement, 32 CUMB. L. R~v. 69, 118
(2001); see David J. Labhart, Note, Securities Analysts: Why These Gatekeepers Abandoned Their
Post, 79 IND. L.J. 1037, 1047-48 (2004) (discussing why the reputational constraint failed to
deter analysts' biased Enron recommendations).
107 As Hillary Sale has pointed out, the problem with investment banks went well be-
yond the blatant fraud of their stock analysts. They wore numerous "conflicting hats" and
repeatedly colluded with fraudulent clients, including Adelphia and Enron. See Hillary A.
Sale, Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and Issuer Choice, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 410-12 (2003).
108 See, e.g., James A. Fanto, Subtle Hazards Revisited: The Corruption of a Financial Holding
Company by a Corporate Client's Inner Circle, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 7, 13-14 (2004) (laying out the
arguments for banks to exercise care in protecting their reputations, which would elimi-
nate the need to keep the commercial and investment banking functions separate and
distinct).
109 See id. at 15-17.
110 See id. In terms of the mechanism behind this seemingly irrational behavior by
investment bankers, Fanto suggests:
Considerable social psychological evidence shows that members of exces-
sively cohesive groups often act for the group's sole benefit despite an ex-
plicit mission to do otherwise (e.g., to act on behalf of a larger
organization, such as a corporation, of which the group is an important
part). A group can transform its members so that they adopt uniform views
and become hostile to dissenters and outsiders.... Social psychologists who
study the formation of these unnaturally cohesive groups explain this be-
havior in terms of a perversion of the natural and ordinary search by indi-
viduals for social identity and for certainty in unsettling environments.
Id. at 16-17 (footnotes omitted).
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ment bankers acted in a manner ultimately extremely destructive to
their firms' reputations. Thanks to Eliot Spitzer and the SEC, the in-
vestment bankers' actions injured their own pocketbooks as well. 1 '
Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, and CS First Boston all enjoyed relatively




During the initial phase of the recent financial scandals, many
took consolation in the fact that mutual funds supposedly remained
the small investor's friend and safe haven. Indeed, even those who
would eliminate government regulation of securities are forced to
concede that unsophisticated investors might suffer perilously under
such a regime and have suggested that such investors could take safe
haven in mutual funds, which would place them on an equal footing
with market professionals.' 1 3
Mutual fund abuses of average investors, however, have been
widespread. The benefits of maintaining a good reputation have not
sufficiently constrained mutual fund managers who seek short-term
gain. Stephen Choi and Jill Fisch have noted, in an understated but
accurate phrase, that "interests of the [mutual fund] manager... may
diverge from those of fund investors." 1' 4 This divergence leads fund
managers to gouge investors and subordinate investor interests for
monetary gain. Many mutual funds have engaged in the following
mischief: raising charges and fees to investors though fund costs have
declined,' 15 subordinating investor interests by allowing late trading
and market-timing trades that could cost investors as much as $4 bil-
lion per year,1' 6 imposing so-called 12b-1 fees primarily to enrich
"'I See Matt Krantz, Analysts Deliver Better Advice, USA TODAY, Feb. 10, 2005, at 1B (not-
ing that New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer imposed a $1.4 billion fine on big Wall
Street firms, and noting a new study finding that if investors listened to analysts post-
Sarbanes-Oxley they would actually have made money as opposed to losing money by fol-
lowing the advice pre-Sarbanes-Oxley).
112 See, e.g., PARTNoY, supra note 43, at 277-85 (noting that by charging excess commis-
sions, a blatant form of extortion, CS First Boston raised the normal 7% commission for
underwriting an IPO to a 65% commission).
113 See Choi, supra note 14, at 300-02; see alsoJonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency
Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDozo L. REV.
909, 929 (1994) (discussing the ability of uninformed investors to neutralize information
asymmetries by hiring a professional to invest on their behalf).
114 See Choi & Fisch, supra note 58, at 280.
115 See Aldo Svaldi, Hidden Costs Can Gouge Mutual Funds, DENVER POST, Oct. 5, 2003, at
1K (noting that "hidden" expenses cost investors $40 billion per year and that "critics argue
[that mutual funds] didn't pass enough [economies of scale] on to their clients").
116 See Diana B. Henriques, Spitzer Casting a Very Wide Net, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, § 3,
at 1 (noting that "market-timing" trades involve "rapid in-and-out trading which can be a
drag on a fund's long-term performance" and are normally prohibited by fund rules, and
noting that "late trading" involves trading after the official trading day is closed based on
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themselves, 117 accepting lavish gifts from brokers in order to steer bus-
iness their way,118  and engaging in other creative forms of
wrongdoing.1 19
Former SEC head Arthur Levitt termed the abuses "the most
egregious violation of the public trust of any of the events of recent
years." 120 Substantial evidence exists both that market-timing abuses
were systemic 121 and that industry professionals knew about the
abuses and did nothing.122 In short, ample evidence supports the pro-
position that the reputational constraint has not prevented mutual
funds from frequently and flagrantly placing their own short-term fi-
nancial interests ahead of investor interests. 123
7. Rating Agencies
Opponents of securities regulation rely heavily upon the ability of
contracting parties to hire reputational intermediaries, such as Stan-
dard & Poor's, to vouch for important financial information. Theo-
retically, ratings agencies should seek to uphold their own
reputations. As Partnoy points out, however, those agencies per-
market-moving information from after the 4 p.m. trading deadline); James Surowiecki,
Right Trade, Wrong Time, NEW YORKER, Oct. 20, 2003, at 74 (explaining further the concepts
of market timing and late trading, and citing a Stanford Business School study that this
behavior "could be robbing investors of more than four billion dollars a year.").
117 See Tom Lauricella, Mutual-Funds Sales Fees Just Enrich Firms, SEC Study Says, WALL
ST. J., May 13, 2004, at C1 (explaining a recent SEC study that concluded that 12b-1 fees,
used by funds for marketing, cost investors ten billion dollars a year with little compensat-
ing benefit).
118 See Andrew Parker, Watchdogs Probe Broker Gifts, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at 17
(describing SEC and NASD inquiries into allegations that brokerage firms gave away such
things as tickets to exclusive sporting events and expensive wine to employees of mutual
funds); James Politi, Lazard Caught Up in US Inquiry into Gofts for Trades, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
12-13, 2005, at 8 (describing the regulatory inquiry into allegations of improper gift-giving
by the investment bank).
119 See, e.g., Adrian Michaels et al., Comment & Analysis: The Mutual Fund Industy Knows
Its Fate Is Based on Public Confidence. It Will Do Anything to Restore That, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 31,
2003, at 17 (noting that while recent investigations have focused on late trading and mar-
ket timing, "complaints against the industry also encompass allegations of illegal personal
enrichment, side deals with brokers involving undisclosed commissions, the mis-selling of
inappropriate products to customers, and the withholding of discounts").
120 Tom Lauricella, For Staid Mutual-Fund Industry, Growing Probe Signals Shake-Up, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 20, 2003, at Al.
121 Simon Targett, Comment & Analysis: Market Timing Is Systemic, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 24,
2003, at 1 (citing a survey regarding the opinions of executives running U.S. pension
funds).
122 SeeJudith Burns, SEC Fund Watcher Blasts Industry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2004, at D7
(quoting Paul Roye, head of the SEC's investment-management division, as saying that
fund industry insiders knew about abuses but "turned a blind eye" to them).
123 See Usha Rodrigues, Let the Money Do the Governing: The Case for Reuniting Ownership
and Control, 9 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 254, 278 (2004) ("Recent settlements suggest that
mutual funds are willing to put their own interests ahead of investors.").
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formed abysmally in the 1990s. 1 24 He notes that they "downgraded
companies only after all the bad news was in, frequently just days
before a bankruptcy filing. Nevertheless, investors continued to trust




Jonathan Macey points out that credit rating agencies are essen-
tially "captured" by the firms they rate. 126 Since the ratings can have
such an extremely significant negative impact upon the rated compa-
nies, agencies are extremely reluctant to downgrade credit ratings,
which would essentially detonate a corporate "nuclear bomb. 12 v
Whatever the cause, rating agencies utterly failed as gatekeepers dur-
ing recent market turmoil. 128 The strong chance that their reputa-
tions would take a hit in the wake of poor performance was clearly
insufficient to turn them into effective gatekeepers.
8. Stock Exchanges
In the recent dot-corn disaster, stock markets were more effective
than most other gatekeepers, though SEC oversight likely accounts for
this anomaly. Even with such oversight, significant problems ensued.
For one thing, the NYSE did not stop widespread illegal trading by
floor brokers. 129 The exchange failed "to police its elite floor-trading
firms and . . . ignor[ed] blatant violations in which investors were
shortchanged on trades totaling roughly two billion shares over three
years."130
Problems of this type arise from a fundamental misalignment of
incentives between the owners of the NYSE and their customers.' 31
124 See PARTNOY, supra note 43, at 171, 250-51.
125 Id. at 352; see also Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Credit Agencies Say Enron Dishonesty Misled
Them, N.Y. TMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at C1 (discussing the Senate Governmental Affairs Com-
mittee's criticism of credit rating agencies for failing to discover and warn investors about
Enron earlier).
126 See Macey, supra note 70, at 342 (explaining that if a rating agency decides to down-
grade a corporation's score based on perceived financial difficulties, the act of the down-
grade itself will prevent the corporation from raising the funds necessary to continue
operating, thus forcing the corporation into bankruptcy).
127 Id.
128 See Coffee, supra note 105, at 318 (noting that along with other gatekeepers, debt
rating agencies that should have provided early warning of trouble did not awake before
the "penultimate moment" preceding the collapses of Enron, WorldCom, and similar
companies).
129 Gary Weiss, Can the Big Board Police Itself?, Bus. WK., Nov. 8, 1999, at 154 ("In June,
the NYSE settled SEC charges that it had systematically failed to curb or detect illegal trad-
ing by many of its 500 floor brokers.").
130 Susanne Craig & Laurie P. Cohen, SEC Takes Another Look at Grasso, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 3, 2003, at Cll.
131 For example, until 1975, when the SEC passed rules to prohibit fixed commissions,
the NYSE maintained them to benefit its members at the direct expense of its customers.
See SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 404-05 & n.*.
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Even Pritchard, an advocate of increased reliance on exchanges as a
substitute for governmental regulation, concedes that exchanges have
little incentive to retard stock manipulation because such activity in-
creases trading volume and, consequently, profits. 132 Pritchard asserts
that substantial incentives compel exchanges to prevent nonmanipula-
tive fraud.13 3 The stronger impetus, however, is to hide fraud by ex-
change members for as long as possible, as exchanges often do.134
Before Congress empowered the SEC to oversee the exchanges, they
were rife with fraud.135 Notwithstanding increased regulation, the
NYSE still hesitates to punish member fraud.1 36
Direct SEC pressure and the incentive of avoiding more aggres-
sive regulation drove most pro-investor reforms by the NYSE over the
132 Pritchard, supra note 11, at 1002-03; see also Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as
Regulator, 83 VA. L. RFv. 1453, 1463 (1997) (conceding that exchanges have little incentive
to stop manipulation, but arguing nonetheless that self-regulation is preferable to govern-
ment regulation because the actual consequences of government intervention on the mar-
ket are unclear); Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The Case
of Market Manipulation, 38J. LAW & ECON. 141, 141 (1995) ("An examination of the history
of self-regulation at 10 exchanges [including the NYSE] prior to the passage of laws pro-
scribing manipulation shows that they took few, if any, measures to curb manipulation.").
133 Pritchard, supra note 11, at 982.
134 See Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Securities Regulation, 83 VA.
L. REv. 1509, 1518 (1997) ("[Tit the extent that an exchange believes that, absent polic-
ing, certain violations are likely to remain undiscovered, its incentives to engage in such
policing are substantially reduced."); see alsoJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate
Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure, 25J. CORP. L. 1, 32 (1999) ("Exchanges
do not have ideal incentives, however, for the task of enforcement.").
135 See VINCENT P. CARosso, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA 254 (1970) (noting that
during the 1920s, there "was a marked decline in [investment banking] judgment and
ethics and unscrupulous exploitation of public gullibility and avarice"); FRASER, supra note
19, at 387-88, 393-94 (describing various fraudulent activities occurring on the exchanges
in the 1920s, including pools and secretly paying radio and printjournalists to tout stocks);
JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE GREAT GAME: THE EMERGENCE OF WALL STREET AS A WORLD
POWER, 1653-2000, at 215 (1999) (noting that in light of pools, wash sales, bear raids, and
the like, the NYSE "was, at least for the quick-witted and financially courageous, a license to
steal. Whom they were stealing from in general, of course, was the investing public at
large.").
136 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 68 n.254 (2001) (noting that "the NYSE
seldom, if ever enforced its own disciplinary rules" before the SEC's creation (citing Stuart
Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791-1860, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 138-39
(1998))).
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years. 137 Recent scandals involving securities analysts provide a salient
example.
138
In sum, Enron and related scandals have demonstrated clearly
that the reputational constraint does not hold up against naked self-
interest as perceived (often irrationally) by economic actors, or
against institutional pressures that cause economic actors to make de-
cisions they would never make outside the institutional context.
13 9
"The bottom line is that reputation alone does not constrain the be-
havior of gatekeepers."
' 140
C. The Reputational Constraint Under a Behavioral Microscope
The reputational constraint has proven insufficient to restrain is-
suers, their officers and directors, and a variety of gatekeepers.14 1 Be-
cause incentives are often misaligned and huge amounts of money
hang in the balance, it is often exceedingly rational, at least in the
short term, for the Andy Fastows, Jack Grubmans, and David Duncans
of the world to utterly ignore their long-term reputations. This short-
term greed by primary actors and gatekeepers helps explain why pri-
vate contracting, self-regulation, and third-party intermediaries are in-
137 Prentice, supra note 85, at 1438-39. For example, proponents of exchange self-
regulation have often noted that the NYSE attempted to require some disclosure by its
listed companies even before the passage of the 1933 Securities Act. See, e.g., Roberta S.
Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. REv. 325, 326-27
(2001). But, as has been pointed out, the NYSE viewed such requirements primarily as a
means of preempting government regulation. See, e.g., id. at 327 ("Historically, listing stan-
dards were seen as a substitute for government regulation. The NYSE argued that if its
listing standards for securities offered for sale adequately protected the investing public,
then government regulation would be unnecessary.").
138 Professors Fisch and Sale point out that SROs such as the NYSE and the NASD
have proved themselves to be unable or unwilling to impose and enforce
meaningful restrictions on analyst conflicts and self-dealing. The NYSE and
the NASD are run by, and primarily are accountable to, their members, the
brokerage firms. Given the importance of investment banking business for
member firms, it is unrealistic to expect the SROs actively to curtail a struc-
ture that promotes these operations.... [B]rokerage firms often benefit
more directly from analysts' work through proprietary trading in covered
securities. It is not surprising, then, that the scope of the regulatory re-
sponse by the SROs has been limited and that the SROs have failed effec-
tively to enforce even the monitoring functions that they self-prescribed.
The SROs have little reason to disturb the status quo.
Fisch & Sale, supra note 91, at 1096 (footnote omitted).
139 SeeJohn M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES OF
CONDucT: BEHAViORAL RESEARCH iNro BusINEss ErHics 13, 13 (David M. Messick & Ann E.
Tenbrunsel eds., 1996) ("[M]ost harmful actions are not committed by palpably evil actors
carrying out solitary actions . .. [but] by individuals acting within an organizational
context.").
140 PARTNOY, supra note 43, at 404.
141 See, e.g., id. at 403 ("Put simply, gatekeepers do not have proper incentives to police
corporate managers, because they do not suffer sufficient reputational consequences even
when they do a poor job of monitoring.").
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adequate to protect investors and preserve healthy securities markets.
The reputational constraint usually runs into a "backward recursion"
problem
where the future benefits from being honest are eventually dwarfed
by the potential return from being self-dealing or negligent. This
can include endgame situations (where, for example, the individual
is at the end of his career or assignment or a firm faces imminent
closure), scenarios where the reputational loss accrues mainly to the
firm but not to the manager (an internal principal agent problem),
situations where the returns to the individual from noncontractual
activities outweigh any expected future losses (a rational argument
for deception), and misinterpretations of the risk from such actions
or their expected penalties (an individual may not be aware of the
magnitude of the risks, or might rationalize this to a minimum).
142
Additionally, cognitive limitations and behavioral biases often
combine to prevent managers, 143 attorneys, 144 auditors, 145 securities
industry professionals, 14 6 and others from acting rationally to preserve
long-term reputational capital.
147
Among these behavioral factors is the "time delay trap." 148 One
can only build a reputation over time; it involves delayed gratification.
However, many people overvalue short-term gratification 149 and dis-
142 Oliver Marnet, Behaviour and Rationality in Corporate Governance, 39 J. ECON. ISSUES
613, 625 (2005).
143 See Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. Bus. LJ. 417 (2003)
(offering a behavioral explanation for the Enron debacle); see alsoJohn C. Coffee, Jr., "No
Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punish-
ment, 79 MicH. L. REv. 386, 393 (1981) ("For example, the executive vice president who is a
candidate for promotion to president may be willing to run risks which are counterproduc-
tive to the firm as a whole because he is eager to make a record profit for his division or to
hide a prior error of judgment.").
144 See Langevoort, supra note 69 (offering a behavioral explanation of attorneys' roles
in their clients' frauds).
145 See Prentice, supra note 62 (offering a behavioral explanation for reckless
auditing).
146 See Prentice, supra note 85, at 1426-34 (offering a behavioral explanation of securi-
ties industry professionals' actions).
147 See Sale, supra note 107, at 407 (noting that the assumption that gatekeepers such
as lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers are largely self-regulated by reputation
constraints turns out to be wrong).
148 SeeJOHN G. CROSS & MELVINJ. GUYER, SocIAL TRAPs 19-22, 39-62 (1980); SCOTT
PLOuS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 242 (1993).
149 See CROSS & GUYER, supra note 148, at 19 ("The immediately desirable consequence
reinforces the wrong action, and since the undesirable consequence occurs only after a
considerable time lag, it has little effect on inhibiting a future recurrence of the same
trap."); Samuel Issacharoff, Can There be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1729, 1732 (1998) (summarizing studies suggesting that "the ability to engage in precise
Bayesian comparisons of likely returns to alternative courses of conduct, particularly over
time, are deeply suspect, if not preposterously naive").
THE INEVITABILITY OF A STRONG SEC
proportionately discount future consequences. 150 They are thus likely
to commit more crime (which involves short-term gains and long-
terms costs) 15 1 and accrue less reputational capital than would be per-
fectly rational. The time delay trap surely played a role in the actions
of the perpetrators of the Enron and other scandals.
A second key behavioral factor stems from the strong tendency of
people to gather, weigh, process, and even remember information in
ways that serve their personal interests.152 The greater the motivation,
the stronger the influence of the self-serving bias:
Consider Enron, which was largely involved in creating new busi-
nesses involving deal terms, derivative structures and unusual com-
modities without clearly established values. When Enron employees
valued these terms, derivatives, and commodities, the decision de-
termined the numbers Enron would put in its financial statements
which, in turn, determined whether hundreds of millions of dollars
of bonuses would be paid to the very employees who were making
the valuations. No wonder those valuations frequently showed
enormous profits when it later turned out that Enron lost money on
the deals. No surprise, then, that in retrospect these judgments ap-
pear to have been unethical.
15 3
Thus, a rational interest in building a long-term reputation is
often short-circuited by a decision to enjoy more immediate rewards,
and the self-serving bias often warps judgments regarding the conse-
quences of that decision.
II
THE CASE FOR A STRONG SEC
Edward Glaeser writes that "the case for laissez-faire is based more
on the fallibility of the state than on the perfection of markets."'
54
Conversely, proponents of a strong SEC point to the weaknesses of the
alternatives to regulation. It is not that the SEC will regulate perfectly.
It surely will not. The point is that the alternatives, including private
150 See MARGERY FRY, ARMS OF THE LAw 82-84 (1951) (finding that some people worry
less about future punishment than others because they irrationally discount the future).
151 See Travis Hirschi, On the Compatibility of Rational Choice and Social Control Theories of
Crime, in THE REASONING CRIMINAL: RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVES ON OFFENDING 105, 114
(Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke eds., 1986) ("[Criminal offenders'] general ten-
dency is toward short-term, immediate pleasure without undue concern for how such plea-
sure is obtained or for long-range consequences.").
152 See generally Robert Prentice, Teaching Ethics, Heuristics, and Biases, 1 J. Bus. ETHICS
EDuc. 57, 58-67 (2004) (discussing the implications of heuristics and biases on ethical
decision making).
153 Id. at 63; see also Prentice, supra note 143 (viewing the Enron scandal through a
behavioral lens).
154 Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Market, 94 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEED-
INGS 408, 412 (2004).
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contracting, self-regulation, and regulatory competition buoyed by the
reputational constraint, are demonstrably less effective.
Limitations on the reputational constraint explain the infamous
agency problem. Every advanced economy in the world has a body of
law to mitigate the effects of the agency problem. Regimes of private
contracting or issuer choice assume away the agency problem by sup-
posing that managers will sacrifice their own personal interests in or-
der to advance their principals' best interests. The evidence in Part I
demonstrates that the agency problem will not disappear so easily.
The intractability of the agency problem means that the case for a
strong-SEC model of securities regulation rests on more than just the
weaknesses of competing models. This Part makes that case. Al-
though overregulation is a constant worry, the targets of regulation
are generally extremely wealthy and powerful commercial entities able
to advocate strongly on their own behalf in Congress, with the press,
and to the SEC directly. Indeed, the more immediate concern is that
such political pressure can stymie effective regulation. Although the
SEC, among others, failed to prevent Enron and related scandals, a
key explanation is that "[t]he United States has under-funded the
hard work of investor protection, holding back from the system the
resources it would take"155 to prevent fraud more effectively. Arthur
Levitt's stories from the 1990s vividly demonstrate how political pres-
sure blocked his instinctive responses that might have averted or at
least minimized the Enron-era scandals.
156
Despite such political pressure, most commentators consider the
SEC an extremely successful regulator.157 The U.S. securities markets
are the world's most efficient and liquid, and inspire a high level of
investor confidence. The SEC has received repeated praise through-
out its almost seventy-year history as a "model agency.' 5  It has not
acted like the stereotypical regulatory monolith. 159 Defying some ad-
155 See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor Protection: The
SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1139, 1140 (2003).
156 See ARTHUR LEvrrT & PAULA DWYER, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND
CORPORATE AMERICA DON'T WANT You TO KNOW; WHAT You CAN DO TO FIGHT BACK
(2002).
157 Archon Fung and colleagues recently noted:
The U.S. system of corporate financial reporting has proven highly effective
in reducing hidden risks to investors and improving corporate governance.
... Over time, the United States has developed the world's most exacting
and most studied system of mandatory financial reporting.
Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of Transparency: What Makes Disclosure Policies Effec-
tive? 19-20 (Ash Inst. for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Harvard Univ., Working
Paper No. OP-03-04, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=766287.
158 See Eric J. Pan, Harmonization of U.S.-EU Securities Regulation: The Case for a Single
European Securities Regulator, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 499, 527 (2003).
159 See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political
Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 531, 543 (2001); Pan, supra note 158, at 527
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ministrative theorists, the SEC typically does not blindly seek its own
aggrandizement, often ceding substantial regulatory control when do-
ing so serves the best interests of investors and the markets.1 60
But the Commission is seldom an industry lapdog. To the extent
that some are still concerned about regulatory capture, 61 the SEC has
successfully avoided it.162 John Coates notes that the SEC has estab-
lished a record of responsiveness and resistance to bureaucratic iner-
tia such that it "remains a highly respected government agency, even
among political constituencies otherwise inclined to doubt the value
or abilities of government regulators." 163 Lawyers who deal with the
SEC, both in the United States and abroad, indicated in a recent study
that they view the agency as both effective and responsive. 164
How has the SEC fared so well?
A. Decision-Making Process
Critics note that human decision makers run the SEC, as they do
issuing companies, accounting firms, and other economic actors.
Thus, the same behavioral biases and cognitive limitations that neu-
tralize the effectiveness of the reputational constraint among those
economic actors might also undermine the efficient decision-making
processes of the SEC. 165 Although this is true, the SEC does have the
benefit of a process that effectively gathers information from all points
of view. The Commission has significant formal and informal avenues
("[T]hough the SEC has a regulatory monopoly over the U.S. securities market, the SEC
does not behave like a monopoly.").
160 See Coates, supra note 159, at 549 (citing as an example the SEC's promulgation of
Rule 144A).
161 See generally Ian Ayres &John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empower-
ment, 16 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 435, 436 (1991) ("[C]apture has not seemed to be theoreti-
cally or empirically fertile to many sociologists and political scientists working in the
regulation literature."); David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the
Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REv. 917, 961 (2001) ("The
most important defect of capture theory is that it is unsupported by the evidence.").
162 See SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at xv ("Few have suggested seriously that the SEC has
been a 'captive' of the industry it regulates .... [S]uch a suggestion cannot be sustained
by a reasonable reading of the Commission's history."); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The
Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REv. 679, 745 (2002) (noting that the
SEC has maintained a pro-investor outlook and that "it does not appear that the SEC has so
far been captured by the managers of public corporations").
Because of its need to preserve franchise and related revenue, Delaware is more sub-
ject to corporate pressure than is the SEC. Therefore, substantive corporate law in the
United States has been much more subject to capture than securities law. See Ronald Chen
& Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate
Law, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1, 121 (2004).
163 Coates, supra note 159, at 543-44.
164 See Pan, supra note 158, at 529.
165 See, e.g., Choi & Pritchard, supra note 19; Glaeser, supra note 154, at 412 ("We can-
not admit the manifold errors that human beings make in their private lives and then
assume that the state will get things right.").
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of communication with the securities industry, thereby ensuring that
it has the input and often the support of the market professionals it
seeks to regulate. 166 Furthermore, the Commission's staff1 67 generally
keeps in close contact with the regulated entities via informal meet-
ings with securities professionals.
168
When the SEC considers new rules, it uses a process that guaran-
tees that it will receive information and arguments from all points of
view, unlike an individual decision maker prone to seeking out only
information to support preexisting views. 169 The Commission pub-
lishes proposed rules, entertains a lengthy comment period, examines
the comments, and responds to them. If the SEC proposes a contro-
versial rule, advocates, opponents, investors, securities professionals,
academics, and others lodge thousands of comments. The process
often results in the Commission substantially adjusting, amending, or
even scrapping its original proposals.
1 70
Although neutralizing cognitive biases often fails, 171 experimen-
tal evidence indicates that "asking or directing experimental subjects
to consider alternative or opposing arguments, positions, or evidence
has been found to ameliorate the adverse effects of several biases, in-
cluding the primacy or anchoring effect, biased assimilation of new
evidence, biased hypothesis testing, the overconfidence phenomenon,
the explanation bias, the self-serving bias, and the hindsight bias."
172
The SEC's rule promulgation process forces the Commission to do
exactly this-consider alternatives and arguments on both sides of the
issue in order to improve the final output of the decision-making
process.
Negative feedback is a similarly important neutralizing technique
also ensured by the comment process. 173 Furthermore, the Commis-
166 See Pan, supra note 158, at 530 (noting that when the SEC makes rules, the securi-
ties industry is able to give "strong input" through the formal notice and comment
process).
167 See id. (noting that the Commission's staff is "competent and professional," and
that "[t]he SEC consistently attracts some of the best lawyers in the United States, most of
whom are experienced securities lawyers").
168 See id.
169 See, e.g., MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 34-35 (5th
ed. 2002) (noting several studies finding confirmation bias among lay people and even
statisticians).
170 For example, a few years ago the SEC proposed the largest ever revision of the 1933
Act's rules, a rewriting so large it was termed the "aircraft carrier." Criticism from public
companies and the private bar convinced the Commission to scrap the plan, however. See
Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Nominee Says Rules Need a Review, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at Cl.
171 See Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and
Economics, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1663, 1747 n.447 (2003).
172 Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for
Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 133 (2002).
173 See Paredes, supra note 49, at 740-41 (noting the usefulness of both a requirement
that decision-makers explicitly consider both sides of the issue and of negative feedback).
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sion makeup of members from both major political parties helps to
foster the give and take that improves the decision-making process.
1 74
Furthermore, SEC employees lack any dramatic conflict of interest.
The millions of dollars that clouded the judgment of Jeff Skilling,
Bernie Ebbers, Henry Blodget, and other major actors in recent scan-
dals are not a factor for SEC employees. More importantly, SEC deci-
sion makers generally operate under two helpful, congressionally
mandated heuristics.
B. Effective Heuristics
Individual decision makers develop heuristics to help them make
decisions when overwhelmed with information. Some of these heuris-
tics are "fast and frugal," and lead to quick and effective decisions in
some contexts. 175 After the Great Crash of 1929, Congress attempted
to restore investor confidence in the nation's markets. Its two primary
tools, embodied in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, were mandatory disclosure 176 and punishment for
fraudulent disclosures. 177 Thus, two very simple heuristics emerged:
Disclosure is good and fraud is bad.
Obviously, these heuristics do not produce perfect results. Ben
Franklin advised, "All things in moderation." Too much disclosure
can be unduly burdensome to issuers and confusing to investors.
Overly aggressive fraud fighting can be inefficient. Generally speak-
ing, however, these two heuristics have well served the SEC, the invest-
174 Mahoney contends that "a government regulator that sets out to determine optimal
exchange rules starts from a substantial disadvantage in information, experience, and in-
centives compared to an exchange." Mahoney, supra note 132, at 1462. Through its rule-
making process, however, the SEC can take full advantage of the exchange's information
and experience, as well as information from other relevant parties. In terms of incentives,
the SEC's relative lack of self-interest renders it better positioned to make rules.
175 See, e.g., Peter M. Todd, Fast and Frugal Heuristics for Environmentally Bounded Minds,
in BOUNDED RATIONALITY. THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBox 51 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten
eds., 2001). It is also true that some of those same heuristics can, in other contexts, lead
decision makers to err substantially. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and
Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 798-99 (2004) (noting that "fast and
frugal" heuristics can work well in some settings but "prove to be poor substitutes for more
complex reasoning" on other occasions).
176 Drafters of these laws were influenced by Justice Brandeis's statement that
"[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." Louis D.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (Harper Torchbooks
1967) (1914).
177 See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 103
(7th ed. 1992) ("The Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives: (1) to provide inves-
tors with material financial .. .information concerning new issues of securities ... ; and
(2) to prohibit fraudulent sale of securities.").
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ing public, 78 and perhaps most importantly, the American capital
markets. 179 The rest of this section focuses on these heuristics.
1. Disclosure Is Good
a. The Benefits of Disclosure
Empirical evidence overwhelmingly indicates that companies and
markets operating under an effective regime of mandatory disclosure
fare better than companies and markets in regimes of voluntary dis-
closure.180 Markets thrive on information. Behavioral finance re-
search indicates that modern securities markets are not as efficient as
many economists have suggested.18 1 There is no doubt that the less
accurate information market participants have ready access to, the less
efficient markets tend to become.
18 2
All market participants will prefer more information to less and
reliable information to unreliable information. Even sophisticated in-
vestors are not skilled at obtaining private information possessed by
firms.1 8 3 This is why ratings agencies, stock analysts, stockbrokers, and
auditors exist, whatever their limitations and faults. To eliminate
these intermediaries would spell disaster; to improve their perform-
ance would be a boon. Furthermore, mandatory disclosure does im-
prove performance because an issuer "is typically the least cost
178 Although the SEC's two primary heuristics are that disclosure is good and fraud is
bad, arguments can be made for more substantive regulation. For example, Shlomo
Benartzi et al. recently suggested that because employees pervasively underestimate the
risk of owning their own employers' stock and their employers tend to overestimate the
benefits associated with employee stock ownership relative to its costs, reforms are justified.
See Shlomo Benartzi et al., Company Stock, Market Rationality, and Legal Reform, J.L. & ECON.
(forthcoming). A mixture of ignorance and excessive optimism put employee savings at
excessive risk that is inconsistent with any rational assessment of the situation. Id.
179 Investor protection is a means to an end-the goal of helping markets by solidi-
fying investor trust in them so that they may thrive. See Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling
Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 495, 545 (2003) ("The reason securities regulation became a matter of federal
concern is that there was a need to increase investor confidence in order to generate capi-
tal formation in the 1930s.").
180 See infra notes 265-78 and accompanying text.
181 Michael Jensen's declaration that "there is no other proposition in economics
which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Market Hypothe-
sis," Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON.
95, 95 (1978), turns out to have been somewhat premature. There is now a mountain of
behavioral finance literature that calls this conclusion into serious question. See, e.g., AD-
VANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1993); HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND
GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING
(2000); ROBERTJ. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT
MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000).
182 See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. EcON. REv. 393, 404 (1980) (indicating that when research is ex-
pensive, capital markets cannot be informationally efficient).
183 See SPENCER, supra note 87, at 77.
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provider of such information... [and] at the same time, mandatory
disclosure reduces the incentive for wasteful and duplicative research
by outsiders."1
8 4
Securities markets are by no means the only markets that benefit
from adequate information. 185 When one governmental agency be-
gan requiring restaurants to display hygiene quality grade cards, res-
taurants quickly improved cleanliness and customers paid more
attention to hygiene quality.'8 6 These improvements decreased the
number of hospitalizations caused by food-borne illness.'8 7 Informa-
tion is more important for securities markets than for any other kind
of market. The buyer of a car, for example, can kick its tires and look
under the hood before deciding what to pay. Investors in securities
can look only at the piece of paper that is the metaphorical stock
share or at other pieces of paper containing the seller's financial state-
ments. The accuracy of those financial statements is more difficult for
an investor to verify than are claims about an automobile made by a
used car salesperson.
Not only does information assist investors in deciding when to
buy or sell, and for how much, it also assists them in exercising their
shareholder right to vote188 and enforcing managers' fiduciary re-
sponsibilities.'8 9 Adequate disclosure can also improve managerial
performance by facilitating the market for corporate control. 190 Dis-
184 See Choi & Fisch, supra note 58, at 308 n.177.
185 Fung and colleagues have noted that "transparency systems" have emerged around
the world as a regulatory tool for implementing social policy that works by requiring corpo-
rations to disclose information about their products and practices. Fung et al., supra note
157, at 1-2. They note:
Government-mandated disclosure plays a unique role in supplementing
and correcting the private provision of socially relevant information. First,
only government can compel disclosure by restaurants, factories, or schools.
Second, only government can require comparable metrics, format, and timing.
Third, only government can create systems backed by deliberative democratic
processes.
Id.
186 See Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evi-
dence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 Q.J. ECON. 409 (2004), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=322883.
187 See id
188 Without mandatory federal disclosure, shareholders would often be very much in
the dark when exercising their franchise because state corporate law has never required
much disclosure. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REV. 583, 611-626
(2004) (noting these and other problems with state corporate law).
189 See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatoy Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1364 (1999).
190 See Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public
Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 135 (2004) (stating that additional disclosure re-
quirements imposed on oil and gas companies in the late 1970s led to a takeover boom in
the industry in the early 1980s).
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closure also discourages litigation.1 9' Federal securities law, not state
corporate law, plays the most important role in corporate governance
in America today, primarily because "disclosure has become the most
important method to regulate corporate managers and disclosure has
been predominantly a federal, rather than a state, methodology."a9 2
Even advocates of drastic reductions in federal securities regula-
tion agree that information is important to markets. Opponents of
regulation believe, however, that unregulated firms will voluntarily dis-
close adequate, accurate information. 9 3 The next section addresses
the accuracy of that belief.
b. The Improbability of Adequate Voluntary Disclosure
Companies with histories of timely disclosure of accurate infor-
mation can generally raise more money cheaper and faster than other
companies.194 Based on this fact, some assume that in the absence of
disclosure requirements, investors will demand and companies will
voluntarily disclose optimal amounts of information. This theory has
not proven accurate for product disclosure, 195 environmental disclo-
191 See Laura Field et al., Does Disclosure Deter or Trigger Litigation?, 39 J. Accr. & ECON.
487, 506 (2005).
192 See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv. 859, 861 (2003).
Some major transnational studies have demonstrated that corporate law protections of
investors from the depredations of managers and majority shareholders are relatively un-
important, by themselves, in promoting capital markets. This finding may reflect the fact
that, absent adequate disclosure, these protections cannot truly be enforced or enjoyed.
See Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. (forthcoming 2006).
193 See, e.g., S. J. Grossman & O.D. Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN.
(PAPERS & PROC.) 323, 323-27 (1980) (asserting that disclosure is privately optimal); Ste-
phen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modern Finance Theory
and Signaling Theory, in IssuEs IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177, 183-88 (Franklin R. Edwards
ed., 1979) (suggesting that market pressures will induce managers to voluntarily disclose
efficient amounts of information).
194 See Mark H. Lang & Russell J. Lundholm, Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Be-
havior, 71 AccT. REv. 467, 490 (1996) (noting that firms that disclose more information
have larger analyst followings, which leads to various benefits).
195 See, e.g., Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices:
An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J. L. & ECON. 651, 672-74 (2000) (noting that
when nutrition labels were voluntary, makers of high-fat salad dressings tended not to dis-
close fat content and that mandatory labeling affected consumer behavior); see also Oliver
J. Board, Competition and Disclosure 1 (Jan. 12, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=652541 (providing economic theory explaining this persis-
tent underdisclosure, and concluding that "mandatory disclosure laws can promote
competition and raise consumer surplus at the expense of firm profits, potentially increas-
ing the efficiency of the market").
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sure, 9 6 or corporate social reporting. 19 7 Voluntary corporate report-
ing has been strategic, not optimal, in each of these areas.
Furthermore, history demonstrates that voluntary disclosure has
not worked in securities markets either. For example, nineteenth-cen-
tury England saw that "the lack of reliable and timely information in-
hibited the formation of broad and anonymous markets for corporate
securities."' 98 After a wave of fraud involving unregulated joint stock
companies, Parliament passed various mandatory disclosure laws in
1844 and 1845.199 Parliament subsequently repealed the require-
ments in order to experiment with a return to voluntary disclosure.
200
The voluntary disclosure regime failed again,20 1 and over time Parlia-
ment extended mandatory disclosure to railroads (in 1868), utilities
(in 1871 and 1882), and banks (in 1878).2o2 Parliament finally man-
dated disclosure for all types of registered companies in the Compa-
nies Act of 1900.203
196 More than 80% of investors want environmental disclosures from issuers. See Marc
J. Epstein & Martin Freedman, Social Disclosure and the Individual Investor, Accr., AUDITING
& AccoUNrAILrrYJ., Dec. 1994, at 94, 106. Yet when corporations do disclose environ-
mental matters, they disclose strategically, often with the purpose of fending off calls for
mandatory disclosure or some other form of regulation. See James Guthrie & Lee D.
Parker, Corporate Social Disclosure Practice: A Comparative International Analysis, in 3 ADvANCES
IN PUB. INTEREsT AccT. 159 (1990); see also Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, Envi-
ronmental Labeling and Incomplete Consumer Information in Laboratory Markets, 43 J. ENv. EcoN.
& MGMT. 113, 116 (2002) (finding in environmental disclosure that "reputations alone are
not sufficient to eliminate this problem"); W. Darrell Walden & Bill N. Schwartz, Environ-
mental Disclosures and Public Policy Pressure, 16J. Accr. & PUB. POL'Y 125, 146 (1997) ("[I]t is
doubtful that substantive environmental information adversely affecting future earnings
and potential cash flows will be reported voluntarily.").
197 A recent survey found that 86% of Americans believe that corporations should dis-
close their support for social issues. New National Cone Survey Finds Americans Intend to Pun-
ish and Reward Companies Based on Their Corporate Citizenship Practices, Bus. WIE, Oct. 2,
2002. It seems, therefore, that in theory companies could burnish their reputations by
developing a reputation for accurate disclosure of their corporate social responsibility in-
formation. In practice, however, reputation does not suffice. See David Hess & Thomas W.
Dunfee, The Kasky-Nike Threat to Corporate Social Reporting: Implementing a Standard of Optimal
Truthful Disclosure as a Solution, Bus. ETHICS Q. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 9, on file with
author) (noting that in both environmental disclosure and corporate social reporting,
firms' motivations for disclosure are "strategic, and not in furtherance of the goal of ac-
countability to stakeholders").
198 BAsKJN & MiRANTI, supra note 19, at 136.
199 See id. at 140 (describing the Joint-Stock Companies Registration, Incorporation,
and Regulation Act of 1844 and the Companies Clauses Consolidations Act of 1845).
200 See id.
201 See id. ("This system of voluntary disclosure was eventually found to be wanting in
the protection it afforded investors.").
202 See Coffee, supra note 134, at 8 n.26 (noting that the Securities Act of 1933 was
modeled upon the Companies Act of 1900).
203 This law became the model for American disclosure provisions. See id.
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Corporate disclosure in the United States was also unreliable and
lacked uniformity before federal regulation. 20 4 The NYSE began re-
quiring annual reports from listed companies by 1895 and later re-
quired even more documents, but "while these financials were better
than nothing, they were hardly of the type that would be particularly
meaningful to the public or stockholders, [who didn't get to see them
anyway.] '205  When the American Institute of Accountants ap-
proached the NYSE in 1927 to suggest improvements in financial dis-
closure by NYSE-listed companies, the NYSE showed no interest.20
6
Just before the Great Crash of 1929, Laurence Sloan conducted
an exhaustive study of the financial disclosures of major American cor-
porations. 20 7 He discovered that industrial financial reports were
"woefully inadequate," lacking uniformity and meaningful explana-
tion. 20 8 Sloan concluded that "[i] n several important respects, no crit-
icism of the abuses that exist can be too harsh." 20 9 Others noted "the
atmosphere of secrecy which prevails so widely in corporate cir-
cles."210 Opaque financial disclosures often forced investors "to read
between the lines."211 Because companies were free to choose among
several different accounting formats, they could mask the unreliability
of their reports.2
12
204 See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 20, at 318 (noting the inadequacy of corporate
disclosure at the passage of the first federal securities laws); GARYJOHN PREVITS & BARBARA
DUBIS MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFI-
CANCE OF ACCOUNTING 103-74 (1998) (noting the inadequacy of disclosure in the "Gilded
Age"); Maurice C. Kaplan & Daniel M. Reaugh, Accounting, Reports to Stockholders, and the
SEC, 48 YALE L. J. 935, 978 (1939) (noting that even after the SEC began mandating vari-
ous disclosures, companies were loath to present important information beyond minimum
requirements).
205 Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Creation of American Corporate Capitalism: The First Public
Response-The Seeds of a Legislative Solution 18 (George Washington Univ. Law Sch., Pub.
Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 105, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=586184 (alteration in original).
206 See I JOHN L. CAREY, THE RISE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 163-64 (1969).
207 LAURENCE H. SLOAN, CORPORATION PROFITS (1929).
208 Id. at 334.
209 Id.
210 MatthewJosephson, Infrequent Corporation Reports Keep Investors in Dark, 36 MAG. OF
WALL STREET 302, 374 (1925).
211 Max Rolnik, Stock Buyers Search for Hidden Profits, 44 MAG. OF WALL STREET 582, 583
(1929) ("There is no established uniformity in the way published [financial] reports are
prepared and we have to read between the lines, so to speak, to learn more than is
disclosed").
The Twentieth Century Fund agreed, concluding that the information contained in
periodic reports by NYSE companies contained information "so meager as to be almost
useless to the stockholder. In numerous instances, indeed, instead of disclosing the report
succeeds in concealing the real conditions." TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, THE SECURITIES
MARKETS 580 (1931), cited in Louis LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 1 SECURITIES REGULATION 205
(3d ed. 1998).
212 See SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 48 (giving examples).
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Deregulation apologists have argued that the NYSE began to im-
pose meaningful disclosure requirements on its listed companies
before Congress passed the federal securities laws, 213 thereby conced-
ing that companies themselves were not voluntarily disclosing ade-
quate information. 214 Furthermore, the disclosure requirements the
NYSE imposed were primarily an attempt to forestall regulation in re-
sponse to a long series of state and federal investigations into
abuses.215 Many companies were able to evade the NYSE disclosure
requirements because other exchanges permitted trading on an un-
listed basis, 216 while the Enrons of their day simply flouted the disclo-
sure requirements, 217 including infamous figures such as Ivar (the
"Match King") Kreuger and Samuel Insull.
218
Deregulation supporters argue that the rise of institutional inves-
tors since 1930 has eliminated the need to require disclosure.219
Again, the historical record does not support this conclusion. Just as
most NYSE-listed companies disclosed only when the exchange forced
them to do so, the companies not covered by the 1934 Exchange Act
did not voluntarily improve their disclosures substantially in suc-
ceeding years. 220 Companies did not volunteer the information and
sophisticated investors did not demand it with sufficient vigor. The
SEC reported in 1963 that many over-the-counter (OTC) companies
"either make no reports to shareholders at all or their reports are
213 See ROMANO, supra note 9, at 16.
214 The little disclosure companies did engage in was for the purpose of fending off
regulation. See Sean M. O'Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants and Con-
gress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REV. 741, 780 (2004) (noting that
proposals of the Industrial Commission around 1900 made the biggest companies feel "it
was in their best interest to begin disclosing information on their own terms, rather than
wait for state or federal regulation").
215 See Robert A. Prentice, Regulatory Competition: A Dream (That Should Be) Deferred, 66
OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1186-87 (2005). The NYSE's important reforms all occurred in an
atmosphere where "demand for reform and government supervision of the securities in-
dustry was incessant." CARosso, supra note 135, at 155.
216 See SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 47 & n.*.
217 See id. at 47-48 (noting that NYSE enforcement was no better than the exception-
riddled state blue sky laws).
218 See generally GALBRAITH, supra note 19, at 82 (quoting Ivar Kreuger as saying that his
success was attributable to silence, more silence, and still more silence, and noting that "his
aversion to divulging information, especially if accurate .... kept even his most intimate
acquaintances in ignorance of the greatest fraud in history"); PREviTS & MERINO, supra note
204, at 267 (noting that Kreuger, Insull, and others had no fear that authorities would
bring in independent auditors).
219 See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 9, at 12.
220 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 211, at 207.
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meager and inadequate." 221 Only the SEC's mandate changed that
situation.22
2
The general failure of companies to disclose any adverse informa-
tion that the law does not require persists today. For example, the
NYSE imposes an obligation upon listed companies "to release quickly
to the public any news or information which might reasonably be ex-
pected to materially affect the market for its securities. '" 223 This obli-
gation extends beyond current SEC requirements; neither companies
nor the NYSE, however, are too concerned with this requirement,
which "is more often honored in the breach, as companies choose
when it is in their interest to make disclosure of events that are not
required to be disclosed."224
This hesitation to disclose does not exist only in the United King-
dom and the United States. Innumerable advisors have told Russian
companies of the potential benefits of cultivating a reputation for full
and accurate voluntary disclosure.225 Yet in Russia today, as in the
United Kingdom and the United States before regulation, "[e]ven the
largest companies refuse to publish meaningful accounts or to be au-
dited. Fleecing shareholders is the norm."
22 6
Not only do firms consistently and naturally withhold bad infor-
mation when they can, but they also often withhold good news, even
when there is no obvious cost of disclosure. 227 So the question arises:
Why does experience with issuer disclosure differ from theories of
market deregulation? The next two subsections explore that
question.
221 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R.
Doc. No. 95, pt. 3, at 10 (1963).
222 See Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the
World, 54-55 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 492,
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=631221.
223 NEW YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 202.05, quoted in Allan Hor-
wich, New Form 8-K and Real-Time Disclosure, 37 REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 109, 109
(2004).
224 Horwich, supra note 223; see also Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward
a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: "Are We There Yet?," 20
CARDOZO L. REv. 135, 163-65 (1998) (noting that the NYSE seems never to enforce this
requirement).
225 See Leonid Rozhetskin, Shareholders Should Demand an End to Company Secrecy, Mos-
cow TIMES, Mar. 14, 1995 (corporate attorney noting the necessity of public disclosure by
new Russian companies); Dmitry Vasilyev, Financial Disclosure: What Is to Be Done?, Moscow
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2002 (former chair of the Russian Federal Securities Commission urging
more and better disclosure).
226 JOHN MCMILLAN, REINVENING THE BAzAAR: A NATURAL HISTORY OF MARKETS 180
(2002).
227 See Ranga Narayanan, Insider Trading and the Voluntary Disclosure of Information by
Firms, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 395, 396 (2000).
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i. Issuer Choice
Most scholars believe today that public companies, absent legal
requirements, will underproduce information. 228 They have not had
difficulty providing theories to explain the historical record. For ex-
ample, even if managers' interests are completely aligned with those
of their firms-an assumption questioned in the next subsection-
managers often decide that full disclosure is not in the firm's best
interest.
Merritt Fox argues that companies left to their own devices will
underdisclose due to two types of proprietary costs. 2 29 First, opera-
tional costs, such as out-of-pocket expenses and diversion of staff time,
will deter socially optimal disclosure. 230 Companies that do not in-
tend to access the capital markets any time soon are particularly sus-
ceptible to the influence of operational costs. 231  And, most
companies tap the equity markets only infrequently. 23 2 If a company
is already cash rich, why would it disclose information that would not
put more cash in the corporate till?
A second impediment comes in the form of interfirm costs that
put a disclosing firm at a disadvantage relative to its competitors.
2 33
228 See Gerard Hertig et al., Issuers and Investor Protection, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPo-
RATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 193, 204 (Reinier Kraakman et al.
eds., 2004) [hereinafter ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW].
229 See Fox, supra note 189, at 1339 ("[I]ssuer choice would lead U.S. issuers to disclose
at a level significantly below [the] social optimum."). Fox argues that even most econo-
mists admit that firms will not voluntarily choose to disclose sufficient information for the
efficient operation of securities markets and, therefore, side with the notion of govern-
ment-mandated disclosure. Id.; see, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 566-67 (giving reasons
to "doubt[ ] that market forces alone would result in the publication of sufficient, reliable,
and timely data."); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 745 (1984) (providing evidence that firms do not
generally voluntarily disclose socially optimal amounts of information). There exists sub-
stantial evidence that firms do not generally voluntarily disclose socially optimal financial
information to signal the market that they are good investments. See Hess & Dunfee, supra
note 197, at 8-9 (citing several studies regarding how proprietary information costs may
depress voluntary disclosure).
230 See Merritt B. Fox, Optimal Regulatory Areas for Securities Disclosure, 81 WASH. U. L. Q.
1017, 1023 (2003).
231 See Ferrell, supra note 222, at 22-23 (noting that it is not in the best interests of a
mature, low-growth firm that does not rely on the markets to raise funds to encourage a
full-disclosure regime, which would primarily benefit potential competitors).
232 See Paredes, supra note 49, at 696 ("[T]he reality is that many companies need to
raise capital relatively infrequently . . . [and] even a poorly performing company will al-
most always be able to raise funds if needed.").
233 See Fox, supra note 189, at 1345-46 (noting that even managers identifying com-
pletely with shareholders will not disclose optimally); Guttentag, supra note 190 (reaching
a similar conclusion based on additional and different reasons); Paul M. Healy & Krishna
G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the
Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. Accr. & ECON. 405, 424 (2001) (citing studies indicating
that firms have an incentive not to disclose information that will reduce their competitive
position, even if it makes it more costly to raise additional equity).
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Efficient managers may choose not to disclose voluntarily if disclosure
would give an advantage to competitors, even if the benefit to inves-
tors from disclosure is greater than the harm the firm would sustain at
the hands of its competitor..
2 34
Competitors aside, firms can clearly benefit in the short run, even
in an efficient stock market, by massaging their financial numbers to
look better than they are or by hiding numbers to prevent investors
from perceiving the sad truth.235 A central premise of disclosure the-
ory is that "any entity contemplating making a disclosure will disclose
information that is favorable to the entity, and will not disclose infor-
mation unfavorable to the entity."236
A firm on the brink of bankruptcy 23 7 has a "last period" incentive
not to disclose that is rational at least in the short term.238 Langevoort
argues persuasively that trading credibility with investors is rational in
a much broader range of scenarios than just the last period.23 9 Exam-
ples include situations in which firms need to encourage external in-
vestment, 240 minimize external financing costs in the short term,2 41 or
increase the stock price for a contemplated IPO.242 If firms lie out-
right for these reasons, as many do from time to time, then they will
certainly avoid full disclosure for similar reasons. They will feel partic-
234 See Oesterle, supra note 224, at 200.
235 See Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for "Dirty
Pooling" and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141 (1997).
236 Ronald A. Dye, An Evaluation of "Essays on Disclosure" and the Disclosure Literature in
Accounting, 32J. Accr. & ECON. 181, 184 (2001).
237 See Kenneth B. Schwartz, Accounting Changes by Corporations Facing Possible Insolvency,
6J. Accr., AUDITING, & FIN. 32, 40-41 (1982) (finding that companies on the brink of
bankruptcy are much more likely to change accounting methods to increase earnings per
share).
238 Jennifer Arlen and William Carney argue that in a "last period" scenario, when a
company is about to become insolvent and managers face mass firings, it is rational for
them to attempt to postpone or avoid disaster by committing securities fraud. SeeJennifer
H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and
Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 694.
239 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 115
(1997).
240 See 1 IRVING KELLOGG & LOREN B. KELLOGG, FRAUD, WINDOW DRESSING, AND NEGLI-
GENCE IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS § 5.02 (1991); Videotape: Cooking the Books: What Every
Accountant Should Know About Fraud (Nat'l Ass'n of Certified Fraud Examiners 1991)
(on file with author) (concluding that financial manipulation occurs in part "to encourage
investment through the sale of stock").
241 See Dechow et al., supra note 33, at 30 ("The results indicate that important motiva-
tions for earnings manipulation are the desire to raise external financing at low cost and to
avoid debt covenant restrictions.").
242 SeeJohn M. Friedlan, Accounting Choices of Issuers of Initial Public Offerings, 11 CON-
TEMP. ACCr. Rs. 1, 2 (1994) (finding "that issuers make income-increasing accruals before
going public").
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ular pressure to avoid disclosure if their managers believe that their
competitors also engage in "financial statement beautification." 24
3
ii. Managerial Discretion
Although evidence indicates that it is in the long-term best inter-
ests of most companies to disclose fully and thereby signal their eco-
nomic strength to the market, most firms seldom disclose more than
the law requires. Before outside forces imposed mandatory disclosure
on firms, corporate managers did not voluntarily disclose much, and
certainly not an optimal amount of, information to investors. "What
they did, what they earned, how many assets they controlled, and simi-
lar matters were facts which they considered to be purely private af-
fairs. To permit the public or their own stock holders to know even
the barest details of their financial affairs was unthinkable ...."244
Today, although cross-listing on U.S. markets sends a positive signal to
investors and creditors, less than ten percent of eligible companies
cross-list.
245
Again, why does practice not accord with laissez-faire theory? Is-
suer self-interest, as noted in the previous subsection, is one factor. A
more prevalent factor is manager self-interest. The mismatch between
the best interests of the managers who make the decisions about dis-
closure and the best interests of the shareholders who own the com-
pany creates an agency problem. 246
Calculated self-interest contributes to this mismatch. A manager
makes a disclosure decision "with an eye.., towards the impact of that
decision on the manager's own utility function." 247 Managers have a
natural tendency to harbor information that gives them an advan-
tage. 248 Obviously, the same incentives that motivate competent and
efficient managers to voluntarily disclose have the effect of discourag-
ing incompetent and inefficient managers from disclosing accurately
243 Hill, supra note 235, at 145 n.10.
244 GEORGE L. LEFFLER, THE STOCK MARKET 452 (2d ed. 1957).
245 See Craig Doidge et al., Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?, 71J. FIN.
ECON. 205, 216 (2004).
246 This is the biggest problem in U.S. public companies, in which ownership is widely
dispersed. In closely held U.S. companies and in most companies around the world, the
bigger problem is the mismatch between the interests of controlling shareholders and mi-
nority shareholders. See Ferrell, supra note 222, at 11-12.
247 James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1200,
1236 (1999).
248 See MCMILLAN, supra note 226, at 172 ("'People are reluctant to share their infor-
mation,' observed the head of a large French Company. 'Managers in particular seem to
think it gives them extra power."'); Fox, supra note 189, at 1411 ("Everything else being
equal, managers prefer as low a level of periodic disclosure as possible[,] ... even when the
gains to the managers are smaller than the losses to the shareholders.").
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and thereby courting discipline or termination. 249 Managers can and
do profit by using private information to trade their companies'
shares. They profit more and therefore will disclose less in a regime
of voluntary disclosure.2 50 Perhaps they are looting the company.
251
Perhaps they wish to hide their excessive compensation. 252 Perhaps
they wish to hide bad news. 253 Finally, perhaps they are successfully
pursuing the interests of the company, but not well enough to trigger
the desired bonuses, and therefore need to hide earnings manage-
ment.254 Given that managers often have bonuses and other incen-
tives tied to their firms' reported financial success, studies indicate
that they aggressively lobby for favorable accounting standards.
255
Managers then use those accounting standards to advance their own
best interests. 256 Several empirical studies indicate that the more
closely managers' compensation is tied to stock price, the more likely
249 See Donald C. Langevoort, Deconstructing Section 11: Public Offering Liability in a Con-
tinuous Disclosure Environment, J. LAw & Corr. PROBS., Summer 2000, at 45 (noting that if
managers sense a risk of being fired for inadequate performance, they will "buy[ ] time by
hiding ... deficiencies"); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Secur-
ities Regulation, DuKE LJ. (forthcoming) (noting that not all companies should be expected
to voluntarily disclose optimal amounts of information because mandatory disclosure will
"reflect inefficient management in lower stock prices and thereby render the corporation a
more likely target for takeovers; expose inefficient management to claims of breach of
fiduciary duties; expose inefficient management to proxy fights; limit management ability
to consume and expropriate value from shareholders; and increase pressure from the
board of directors" (footnotes omitted)).
250 See Narayanan, supra note 227, at 398 ("[S]tricter enforcement of insider trading
laws and/or larger penalties for violating these laws will move managers towards full disclo-
sure because expected insider trading profits will decline.").
251 See I KELLOGG & KELLOGG, supra note 240, § 1.03 ("There have been, there are, and
there will be a substantial number of CEOs, CFOs, and CPAs whose moral standards are
low or nonexistent. Those individuals betray the shareholders, partners, lenders, and
bondholders to whom they owe a duty of trust.").
252 See Bethany McLean, Why Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 58, 61.
253 See Hertig et al., supra note 228, at 204 ("[B]ad news hurts managers by reducing
their compensation and diminishing their job security. Thus, the worse news becomes, the
less likely managers are to disclose it voluntarily.").
254 See Flora Guidry et al., Earnings-Based Bonus Plans and Earnings Management by Busi-
ness-Unit Managers, 26 J. Accr. & ECON. 113, 140 (1999) (reporting an empirical study
finding "evidence consistent with business-unit managers manipulating earnings to maxi-
mize their short-term bonus plans").
255 See Lawrence Revsine, The Selective Financial Misrepresentation Hypothesis, Acor. Horu-
ZONS, Dec. 1991, at 16, 21 (citing studies indicating that corporate "managers lobby [ac-
counting] standard setting bodies to approve reporting methods that maximize managers'
welfare" and then use the resulting standards for that purpose).
256 See, e.g., Andrew A. Christie, Aggregation of Test Statistics: An Evaluation of the Evidence
on Contracting and Size Hypotheses, 12J. Accr. & ECON. 15, 33 (1990) (finding that manage-
rial compensation is one of the key variables explaining accounting procedural choice);
Dan S. Dhaliwal et al., The Effect of Owner Versus Management Control on the Choice of Account-
ing Methods, 4J. Accr. & EcoN. 41, 52 (1982) ("[M)anagement controlled firms are more
likely than owner controlled firms to adopt accounting methods which result in increased
or early reported earnings.").
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managers are to manipulate earnings.257 There is similar empirical
evidence that managers engage in earnings overstatement so that they
may profit from insider trading.
258
Another recent study shows that firms that restated their
financials following SEC allegations of accounting fraud from 1996 to
2002 paid $320 million in income taxes "as a result of overstating their
earnings by approximately $3.36 billion." 259 Thus, in order to earn
bonuses, managers are often willing to waste corporate assets by pay-
ing taxes that are not owed on profits that were not earned.
260
Given these incentives, if disclosure is voluntary, "managers will
focus on improving the limited set of their performance indicators
that are observable by investors, even when improving these measures
does not increase the value of the firm." 26 1 The more discretion man-
agers have to make disclosure decisions, the more strategically they
can manipulate the timing, amount, quality, and fact of disclosure.
When managers have more discretion, they have more opportunity to
profit from insider trading.
2 62
257 See, e.g., Daniel B. Bergstresser & Thomas Philippon, CEO Incentives and Earnings
Management, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=640585
(providing empirical evidence indicating that the use of discretionary accruals to manipu-
late reported earnings is more pronounced at firms where the CEO's potential total com-
pensation is more closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings); Natasha Burns &
Simi Kedia, The Impact of Performance-Based Compensation on Misreporting, 79J. FIN. ECON. 35,
63 (2006) (finding that "CEOs with option portfolios that are more sensitive to the stock
price are significantly more likely to misreport").
258 See, e.g., Messod D. Beneish, Incentives and Penalties Related to Earnings Overstatements
that Violate GAAP, 74 Ace-r. REv. 425 (1999) (finding that executives of firms managing
earnings are more likely to engage in insider trading than managers of firms not overstat-
ing earnings); cf Shane A. Johnson et al., Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud 3
(Apr. 16, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=395960
(finding that "executives at fraud firms have significantly larger equity-based compensation
and greater financial incentives to commit fraud than do executives at ... control firms,"
and that they "earn significantly more total compensation by exercising significantly larger
fractions of their vested options .. .during the fraud years").
259 See Merle Erickson et al., How Much Will Firms Pay for Earnings That Do Not Exist?
Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings, 79 Actr. REv. 387, 389 (2004).
260 The evidence of managers forfeiting shareholder interests is ubiquitous. See, e.g.,
Michael D. Klausner & Robert Daines, Agents Protecting Agents: An Empirical Study of Takeover
Defenses in Spinoffs (Stanford Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 299, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=637001 (finding that when
parent corporation managers stand to benefit from entrenching spinoff company manag-
ers, they are more likely to set up a spinoff governance structure containing antitakeover
provisions, even though it reduces parent share value).
261 Guttentag, supra note 190, at 133.
262 SeeJesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrad-
ing Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 303, 357-59 (1998) (arguing that requiring pretrading
disclosure would create disincentives from engaging in insider trading); H. Nejat Seyhun,
The Effectiveness of the Insider-Trading Sanctions, 35J.L. & ECON. 149, 158-67 (1992) (finding,
among other things, that insiders generate abnormal profits when trading their own firm's
stock).
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In addition to these short-term, rational reasons for faulty disclo-
sure, managers also have numerous irrational motivations to minimize
disclosure. Most managers, like most people, tend to be both over-
confident in their own abilities and unduly optimistic about their own
and their firms' future performance. 263 Therefore, managers often
conclude that disclosure leads to unnecessary, and perhaps counter-
productive, meddling or supervision. The self-serving bias drives man-
agers to believe that they caused their companies' successes while
circumstances beyond their control caused the companies' failures.
These factors can lead managers to underdisclose even as they try to
act in the company's best interests. In the end, voluntary full disclo-
sure seldom occurs in the real world.
2 64
c. Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution
The variety of firm-oriented and self-interested motivations of
managers justify mandatory disclosure. Mandatory disclosure is, how-
ever, an admittedly costly and somewhat blunt instrument. Although
regulators can tailor disclosure for differently sized firms and a variety
of transactions, the exceptions and exemptions are still not as specific
as stipulations reached by sophisticated parties who engaged in exten-
sive negotiation. Nonetheless, mandatory disclosure has numerous
advantages over a voluntary system.
i. Benefits for Issuers
First, mandatory disclosure may be cheaper for issuers than vol-
untary disclosure. Mandatory disclosure relieves issuers from negotiat-
ing individually tailored disclosure packages with a variety of investors
and lenders.265 Mandatory, uniform rules can therefore save, as well
as cause, transaction costs.
More importantly, mandatory disclosure allows quality firms to
signal the market effectively, thus benefiting issuers. Absent costly in-
formation searches, investors typically have difficulty distinguishing
honest from dishonest, prosperous from destitute, and reliable from
263 See generally Paredes, supra note 49 (discussing possible sources of CEO
overconfidence).
264 See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regu-
lation and Externalities, 13 REv. FIN. STUD. 479, 480 ("Full voluntary disclosure ... rarely
seems to occur in reality, and firms typically do not disclose more than regulation
requires.").
265 Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1047, 1092 (1995) (noting that mandatory regimes can "save[ ] parties from negotiat-
ing over the content of disclosure where the outcome is not likely to vary among firms, and
thus the costs of complying with the one-size-fits-all rule are less than the costs of negotiat-
ing individual levels of disclosure").
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shaky firms.266 Any firm can claim current profits and favorable long-
term prospects. Furthermore, many firms can fool both sophisticated
investors and the entire market, as the dot-corn bubble vividly illus-
trated. Without a meaningful antifraud penalty, firms can lie with rel-
ative impunity. Even with a meaningful antifraud penalty, firms in a
voluntary disclosure regime can easily disclose selectively. Firms may
disclose good numbers in one quarter, but not in the next quarter
when the numbers are not as favorable, or they may disclose the num-
bers in a particular format in one quarter, but in a different format in
the next quarter in order to hide unfavorable developments.
In markets that allow such "cheap talk,"267 actors are often unable
to signal quality. Strategic disclosure is relatively easy, and it therefore
forces investors to discount the price of the shares of all issuers. 268
Even in today's economy, voluntary disclosures send few meaningful
signals absent a requirement that the firm will also disclose tomorrow,
and that governmental sanctions will result from either a failure to
disclose or from affirmative deception. 269 Crooks can easily mimic the
candid disclosure of an honest firm, and, absent required disclosure,
current candid disclosure may degrade in the future.270
Evidence indicates that in situations in which consumers care
about the environment and would like to purchase "green goods,"
third-party certification is needed, at a minimum, to give credence to
claims made by sellers.271 Another study indicates that when auditors
cannot clearly signal their professional quality, those who attempt to
266 This is an example of Akerlof's famous "lemon problem," the problem of adverse
selection resulting from information asymmetries. See George Akerlof, The Market for Lem-
ons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
267 SeeJordi Brandts & Gary Charness, Truth or Consequences: An Experiment, 49 MGMT.
Sci. 116, 120 (2003) (noting that cheap talk is not necessarily effective when the parties'
interests are not aligned). See generally Vincent Crawford, A Survey of Experiments on Commu-
nication via Cheap Talk, 78 J. ECON. THEORY 286 (1998) (surveying empirical studies on
cheap talk).
268 Voluntary disclosure depends crucially upon its credibility because the market real-
izes the possibility of managers' self-serving motivations. One major method of quality
assurance is comparison of the voluntarily disclosed information to disclosure of later-re-
quired information. If, for example, voluntarily disclosed projections are not later real-
ized, litigation may result, and the system of required disclosure, backed up by the legal
system, has then played an important role in providing credibility for voluntary disclosures.
See Healy & Palepu, supra note 233, at 425.
269 See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS
161 (2003); Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough: The Significance of
Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 223, 244 ("Absent regulation, issuers control not only access to, but
the accuracy and timing of, firm-specific disclosure.").
270 Franco, supra note 269, at 306.
271 See Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, Environmental Labeling and Incomplete
Consumer Information in Laboratory Markets, 43 J. ENVrL. ECON. & MGMT. 113, 115 (2002)
(finding that cheap talk in the form of unregulated claims "often fails to generate the
efficient delivery of clean products").
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enhance their reputation cannot charge significantly higher prices,
therefore lowering their profits.
272
Mandatory disclosure allows issuers to raise external funds be-
cause lower adverse selection costs allow investors to assume some-
thing other than that the issuer is low value. 273 By significantly
constraining the ability of an issuer to strategically withhold informa-
tion,274 mandatory disclosure greatly increases investor confidence in
the information disclosed.
275
Mandatory disclosure also minimizes the opportunities of insiders
to engage in insider trading or otherwise defalcate. 276 Issuers can not
only signal the value of their shares with reasonable assurance, but can
commit credibly to a lower level of asset diversion.277 In regimes with
widely dispersed shareholders, who worry about mistreatment by man-
agers, and in regimes with concentrated ownership, in which share-
holders worry about exploitation by controlling shareholders,
investors are more willing to invest and creditors more willing to loan
if future disclosure is mandated. 278
272 See generallyJ. A. Brozovsky & F. M. Richardson, The Effects ofInformation Availability
on the Benefits Accrued from Enhancing Audit-Firm Reputation, 23 Accr., ORGS. & Soc'v 767
(1998) (examining the effect of reputation on prices and profits).
273 See Ferrell, supra note 222, at 19-20. For this reason, firms tend to voluntarily dis-
close more information just before they attempt to access the markets than they do at
other times. See Mark Lang & Russell Lundholm, Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst Rat-
ings of Corporate Disclosures, 31 J. Accr. REs. 246, 269 (1993) (finding that firms issuing
securities tend to disclose more than firms not issuing securities); Christian Leuz & Robert
E. Verrecchia, The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure, 38J. AcCT. REs. (SupP.) 91,
121 (2000) (finding in a study of German firms that a switch from the German to a fuller
reporting regime, such as a U.S.-style regime, appeared via indirect measures to allow them
to "garner economically and statistically significant benefits").
274 See Franco, supra note 269, at 289.
275 As Franco notes:
Mandatory disclosure addresses the problem of informational asymmetry in
two ways. It increases (at least in the United States) the amount of firm-
specific disclosure provided by issuers. In this sense, it redresses the
chronic incentives that lead issuers to provide less than adequate disclo-
sure.... It also significantly constrains issuer discretion to withhold infor-
mation strategically. This latter purpose gives rise to a signaling effect.
Mandatory disclosure enables investors to make better inferences about ma-
terial non-public information held by issuers.
Id.
276 See Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage
What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1335, 1339 (1996) ("[Mandatory disclosure] makes
American industry more efficient and competitive... [because] corporate executives, like
the rest of us, behave more honestly, diligently and competently when they know that their
stewardship of other people's money is open to scrutiny.").
277 See Ferrell, supra note 222, at 20.
278 Id. at 6-8.
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ii. Benefits for Investors
Mandatory disclosure requirements create more useful public in-
formation than was ever the case under previous voluntary systems.
279
The history of voluntary disclosure establishes that fact. Mandatory
disclosure protects lay investors who lack the wherewithal to bargain
for optimal disclosure. 280 Even institutional investors "do not possess
private information or great skill at obtaining such information, and
they would accordingly not benefit from a regime that minimizes
firms' public disclosures. '" 281 Mandatory disclosure benefits all inves-
tors, because it provides them with roughly the same information they
would bargain for if they were rational. The investors save, however,
the time and expense of bargaining with each and every firm in which
they wish to invest, and therefore can more easily diversify their
portfolios.
Mandatory disclosure reduces search and information processing
costs for investors by requiring cheap, 282 readily available, 283 standard-
ized,284 and relatively reliable 28 5 disclosure of information. Required
279 See Franco, supra note 269, at 322-23 (explaining why issuer-choice standards will
lead to disclosure that is both quantitatively and qualitatively inferior).
280 It is often argued that mandatory disclosure does not benefit lay investors because
they generally do not read the information that the SEC requires firms to disclose. How-
ever, Franco aptly points out that the fact that investors "seldom take the time to study
issuers' disclosure materials ... is a product of the success of mandatory disclosure rather
than evidence of its marginal value." Id. at 296.
281 Romano, supra note 12, at 2416.
282 Mandatory disclosure reduces overall search costs because companies can obviously
disclose information within their possession more cheaply than investors and analysts can
uncover it through investigation. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 249, at 24-27.
Indeed, some inside information would not be available even if investors and analysts were
to spend excessive sums in search costs. See id.
283 Absent mandatory disclosure, analysts, institutional investors, and others must en-
gage in costly, repetitive searches of information. See Coffee, supra note 229, at 733-34.
284 See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 269, at 161 ("If each firm chose its own idiosyn-
cratic method of disclosure, comparability across firms would be lost-a problem that is
apparent among the private equity funds, where investors complain about the difficulty of
comparing fund performance when each fund can choose the method of disclosing per-
formance that it prefers."); MichaelJ. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, The OptimalAmount
of Discretion to Allocate in Disclosure, 105 Q.J. ECON. 427, 440 (1990) (showing that standard-
izing disclosure requirements "makes it easier to filter out the common noise[, which]
allows the market to more efficiently price projects and increases the efficiency of the flow
of capital").
285 As Rock points out, it is highly problematic for issuers to voluntarily bond them-
selves to provide credible and accurate financial information into the future. See Edward
Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclo-
sure, 23 CADozo L. REv. 675, 685-86 (2002). The SEC's disclosure system solves this con-
tracting problem by (a) serving a standardizing function regarding the form and quality of
disclosure, (b) providing a mechanism for adjusting to the evolving needs regarding re-
porting obligations, (c) providing a credible and specialized enforcement mechanism, and
(d) limiting exit by corporations. Id. at 686-87.
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disclosure reduces both private transaction costs28 6 and public trans-
action costs2 8 7 in capital and other markets, 288 and is needed to help
defeat strategic disclosure.
28 9
iii. Theory and Evidence
Despite the obvious theoretical advantages of regularly disclosing
comparable and accurate information, critics claim that there is no
proof that SEC disclosure requirements have actually been benefi-
cial. 290 Although evidence regarding the 1933 and 1934 Acts remains
mixed in light of the potential methodological shortcomings of early
and conflicting studies, 291 several more recent and sophisticated stud-
286 John A. Hepp & Brian W. Mayhew, Audits of Public Companies 19-20 (June 29,
2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=564266 (noting
that mandated disclosure minimizes costs of sharing information because issuers and inves-
tors need learn only one accounting and auditing language, reduces negotiations costs
because investors and issuers need not negotiate the criteria and scope of information
sharing, and ensures that all firms accessing public capital markets bear the same costs).
287 Id. at 20 (noting that the "costs of public monitoring of corporate activities would
be much higher in the absence of publicly mandated audited financial statements, as
would the costs of collecting information for public policy decisions," and offering as an
example tax collection, in which correspondence between audited financial statements
and corporate tax returns is used by the IRS as a preliminary screen for tax code
compliance).
288 Id. at 19 ("A mandated audit conducted by an independent auditor based on pub-
lic auditing standards (i.e. GAAS) with criteria specified by public accounting standards
(i.e. GAAP) greatly reduces private transaction costs in comparison to private transaction
costs without mandated auditing and standards.").
289 Hess & Dunfee, supra note 197, at 34 (noting that "[ s] tandardization is necessary to
overcome the problem of strategic disclosure").
290 See, e.g., ROMANo, supra note 9, at 16-26 (citing studies of the 1933 and 1934 Acts in
support of the claim that SEC-mandated disclosure was not necessarily more efficient than
voluntary disclosure).
291 Several early studies produced conflicting results. See George J. Benston, Required
Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM.
ECON. REV. 132 (1973) (finding "no measurable positive effect" resulting from the disclo-
sure requirements of the 1934 Act); Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on
Investor Information and the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 295, 313 (1989)
(finding lower issue-specific risk after the 1933 Act); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of
the Securities Markets, 37J. Bus. 117, 124 (1964) (finding that once regulatory costs are taken
into consideration, the 1933 Act most likely did not save investors any money).
These early studies do not settle the debate. However, many have concluded that
these early studies do, in fact, indicate that greater pricing accuracy resulted from the
disclosure requirements. See John C. Coffee Jr., Convergence and Its Critics: What Are the
Preconditions to the Separation of Ownership and Control? 48 (Columbia Univ. Ctr. for Law &
Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 179, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=241782 ("[TIhe total package of new disclosures produced immediate and observa-
ble results that are logically interpreted as an increase in pricing accuracy."); Fox, supra
note 189, at 1379 ("Taken as a whole, the Stigler, Simon, and Benston studies suggest that
imposition of the current system of mandatory disclosure did increase price accuracy and
the amount of meaningful information in the market.").
It is no wonder that these studies remain controversial, given the confounding events
taking place at the time, most particularly the Great Depression. See Allen Ferrell, Man-
dated Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market 7 (Harvard John
2006] THE INEVITABILITY OF A STRONG SEC
ies provide empirical evidence for the logical proposition that more
information creates more accurate stock prices and, ultimately, more
efficient securities markets. 292 For example, recent empirical studies
indicate the market-enhancing benefits of numerous SEC disclosure
requirements, such as the 1964 requirement that OTC companies
come within the 1934 periodic disclosure system,293 the 1980 require-
ment that every issuer's filing contain a management discussion and
analysis section wherein management discusses and analyzes the is-
suer's financial situation,294 the 1999 requirement that OTC Bulletin
Board (OTCBB) companies comply with 1934 Act reporting require-
ments, 295  the Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) promulgated in
2000,296 and the November 2000 requirement that issuers disclose
M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 453, 2003), available at http://
ssm.com/abstract=500123 (noting that with regard to the conflicting findings of the Si-
mon, Benston, and Stigler studies that "[i]t is extraordinarily difficult to adjudicate this
debate convincingly given the econometric evidence indicating that the Great Depression
did have a profound effect on the capital markets").
292 See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 249, at 40 (noting the traditional argu-
ments supporting mandatory disclosure, namely that absent required disclosure, there will
be both too much and too little investment in securities research).
293 Ferrell, supra note 222, at 54 (finding a "substantial reduction" in the volatility of
OTC stock returns and price movement more in parallel with the listed market, both indi-
cating increased pricing accuracy); Michael Greenstone et al., Mandated Disclosure, Stock
Returns, and the 1964 Securities Act Amendments, Q. J. ECON. (forthcoming 2006) (finding
evidence that the 1964 amendments created $3.2 to $6.2 billion in value for shareholders
of the OTC firms in the study sample).
294 Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New
Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REv. 331 (2003) (finding that the new requirement made share
prices more accurate, and producing evidence that greater share price accuracy makes
capital allocation more efficient).
295 See, e.g., Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure
Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. Accr. & ECON. 233, 261 (2005) (find-
ing that firms following the new OTCBB rules exhibited significant increases in market
liquidity, that those firms already in compliance SEC regulations also exhibited positive
increases in liquidity, and that the requirement directly helped previously noncompliant
firms).
296 See, e.g., Markus K. Brunnermeier, Information Leakage and Market Efficiency, 18 REv.
FIN. STUD. 417, 420 (2005) (arguing that Regulation FD increases informational efficiency,
at least to the extent that it suppresses information leaks); Brian J. Bushee et al., Managerial
and Investor Responses to Disclosure Regulation: The Case ofReg FD and Conference Calls, 79 AcCT.
REv. 617, 619 (2004) (finding that Regulation FD did not decrease the amount of informa-
tion disclosed during investor conference calls, that other predicted disadvantages of the
rule had not materialized, and that small investors were now able to capitalize on disclosed
information in the same way as large investors); Venkat Eleswarapu et al., The Impact of
Regulation Fair Disclosure: Trading Costs and Information Asymmetry, 39J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALY-
sis 209, 209 (2004) (finding that through Regulation FD "the SEC appears to have dimin-
ished the advantage of informed investors, without increasing volatility"); Ronen Feldman
et al., Earnings Guidance After Regulation F,.J. INVESTING, Winter 2003, at 31, 40
("[I]nvestors can process the information companies disclose in their earnings guidance,
and react to it in the proper manner, as regulators envisioned in passage of Regulation
FD."); Andreas Gintschel & Stanimir Markov, The Effectiveness of Regulation ID, 37J. Acr. &
ECON. 293 (2004) (finding that Regulation FD has been effective in curtailing selective
disclosure); Frank Heflin et al., Regulation ID and the Financial Information Environment: Early
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fees paid to auditors. 29 7 Other domestic studies are similarly
supportive.2
98
Empirical evidence also supports the theory that mandatory dis-
closure improves the monitoring capability of third parties, reduces
the costs for investors, and thereby lowers the price for firms that raise
Evidence, 78 Accr. REv. 1 (2003) (finding that Regulation FD led to improved informa-
tional efficiency and a substantial increase in the disclosure of forward-looking informa-
tion, and no reliable evidence of impairment of analysts' forecasts); Afshad J. Irani, The
Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the Relevance of Conference Calls to Financial Analysts, 22
REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & Accr. 15, 15-16 (2004) (presenting empirical evidence that Reg-
ulation FD improved analysts' forecast accuracy); Chun I. Lee et al., Effect of Regulation FD
on Asymmetric Information, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May/June 2004, at 79, 87 (finding little support
for critics of Regulation FD who claimed that it would increase volatility and reduce the
quantity of information introduced into the market); Orie E. Barron et al., Leveling the
Informational Playing Field, 3 REv. AccT. & FIN. 21 (2004) (concluding that "in affording
nonprofessionals access to higher levels of disclosure, Regulation FD could result in more
informationally diverse sets of investors, and hence more efficient, share prices"); Partha
Mohanram & Shyam V. Sunder, How has Regulation Fair Disclosure Affected the Func-
tioning of Financial Analysts? 29-30 (Dec. 2003) (unnumbered working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=297933 (finding that in the post-Regulation FD period, the best
analysts continued to distinguish themselves, while all analysts' incentives to gather private
information and perform independent analysis were enhanced); Philip Shane et al., Earn-
ings and Price Discovery in the Post-Reg. FD Information Environment: A Preliminary
Analysis (Nov. 15, 2001) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://leeds-
faculty.colorado.edu/shanep/research/regfdpaper.pdf (finding that price discovery im-
proved and price volatility decreased after Regulation FD); Shyam V. Sunder, Investor Ac-
cess to Conference Call Disclosures: Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on Information
Asymmetry 34 (Apr. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://icf.som.yale.edu/
pdf/yale.seminarshyam.pdf (finding that Regulation FD had not caused firms to disclose
less information voluntarily and that the bid-ask price spread had decreased). But see, e.g.,
Afshad J. Irani & Irene Karamanou, Regulation Fair Disclosure, Analyst Following, and Analyst
Forecast Dispersion, 17 AcCr. HoRIZONS 15, 15 (finding that Regulation FD "led to a decrease
in analyst following and an increase in forecast dispersion"); Warren Bailey et al., Regula-
tion FD and Market Behavior around Earnings Announcements: Is the Cure Worse than
the Disease? 16-18 (July 2, 2002) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=311364 (finding that Regulation FD seems to impair the ability of ana-
lysts to reach a consensus); Armando R. Gomes et al., SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure,
Information, and the Cost of Capital, July 8, 2004) (unnumbered working paper), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=529162 (finding that the adoption of Regulation FD
caused a reallocation of information-producing resources, raising the cost of capital for
some small firms).
297 SeeJere R. Francis & Bin Ke, Disclosure of Fees Paid to Auditors and the Market
Valuation of Earnings Surprises 3 (Jan. 5, 2006) (unnumbered working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=487463 ("'We conclude.., that the SEC's mandatory disclosure
of audit and nonaudit fees provides new information that investors could not obtain from
other sources, and that investors perceived high nonaudit fees negatively after their
disclosure.").
298 Healy and Palepu have examined the capital markets research studies and note
that "[t]he most significant conclusion is that regulated financial reports provide new and
relevant information to investors." Healy & Palepu, supra note 233, at 413. Healy and
Palepu expressly note, however, that this research does not necessarily prove that regulated
disclosure is preferable to voluntary disclosure because "it does not compare the relative
informativeness of regulated and unregulated financial information." Id.
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capital. 299 Higher disclosure requirements can even lead to increased
venture capital financing, given that venture capitalists can foresee
their ability to cash out of prudent investments on more favorable
terms under such a regime.
3 0 0
Transnational empirical research similarly supports mandatory
disclosure, as it indicates that countries that require disclosure enable
their companies to attract investors and therefore have deeper and
broader capital markets.3 0 1 Similarly, companies from low-disclosure
jurisdictions that list on exchanges with higher disclosure require-
ments tend to benefit substantially.
30 2
These empirical studies strongly suggest that mandatory disclo-
sure works, both because it is mandatory and because it generally re-
sults in increased disclosure. As Rock points out:
The lesson here is that one cannot neglect the extent to which
mandatory disclosure regulation helps issuers and investors contract
for capital.... [T] he problem of contracting for a given level, qual-
ity, and permanence of disclosure is not trivial and one should not
ignore the extent to which the current system succeeds. Investment
299 See Christine A. Botosan, Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capita4 72 Accr. REv.
323, 346-47 (1997) (finding that more disclosure in SEC annual reports reduces the cost
of equity capital for firms not closely followed by analysts); M. Gietzman &J. Ireland, Cost of
Capital, Strategic Disclosures and Accounting Choice, 32J. Bus. FIN. & AccT. 599, 631-32 (2005)
(finding that U.K. companies that disclose more have lower capital costs).
300 See RAjAN & ZINGALES, supra note 269, at 254-55.
301 See Cross & Prentice, supra note 15, at 47 (finding that mandatory securities laws
correlate to stronger and more efficient stock markets); Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, Inter-
national Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal Institutions and Securities Regulation
Matter?, J. Accr. REs. (forthcoming June 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=641981 (finding that countries with extensive securities regulation and strong en-
forcement mechanisms exhibit lower cost of capital levels than nations with weak legal
institutions, even when other factors are controlled); Ole-Kristian Hope, Disclosure Practices,
Enforcement of Accounting Standards, and Analysts'Forecast Accuracy: An International Study, 41
J. AccT. REs. 235, 264-65 (2003) ("Controlling for firm- and country-level factors.... firm-
level annual report disclosure level is positively associated with forecast accuracy, [sug-
gesting] that firm-level disclosures provide useful information to analysts."); Ross Levine,
Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, 8J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 8, 33 (1999) ("Countries where
corporations publish relatively comprehensive and accurate financial statements have bet-
ter developed financial intermediaries than countries where published information on cor-
porations is less reliable."); Hazem Daouk et al., Capital Market Governance: How Do Security
Laws Affect Market Performance ?,J. CoRuP. FIN. (forthcoming) (finding that better capital mar-
ket governance features, including earnings disclosure and enforcement of insider trading
laws, are linked to a decrease in the cost of equity and increases in market liquidity and
pricing efficiency); Fung et al., supra note 157, at 21 (finding that international investment
funds prefer to hold assets in countries with greater disclosure and that during crises funds
tend to flee more opaque markets); La Porta et al., supra note 192 (finding that disclosure
and liability rules benefit stock markets).
302 See, e.g., Mark H. Lang et al., ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does Cross Listing in the
United States Improve a Firm's Information Environment and Increase Market Value?, 41 J. Accr.
RES. 317, 342 (2003) (finding that firms that cross list on U.S. exchanges have greater
analyst coverage and increased forecast accuracy and that those translate into higher
valuations).
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capital is available all over the world, yet it is the U.S. capital mar-
kets, under the SEC disclosure system, that are without peer in the
public financing of new enterprises, high tech and otherwise, do-
mestic and foreign.
30 3
The benefits of mandatory, uniform, comparable disclosure are
obvious. 30 4 Critics and supporters of mandatory disclosure may have
countervailing theories, but strong empirical evidence supports
mandatory disclosure.
2. Fraud Is Bad
The benefits of requiring disclosure outlined above cannot be re-
alized without some reasonable assurance that the information that is
disclosed is reasonably accurate. If companies must disclose certain
information but can lie about it, investors will sensibly avoid the mar-
kets. Therefore, the second heuristic that guides SEC policy making
is: Fraud is bad. Pretty much everyone, communitarians and con-
tractarians, liberals and conservatives, can agree with this broad con-
clusion (though perhaps not its policy implications).
a. The Inefficiency of Fraud
Fraud is not only unfair, but also inefficient. Securities fraud im-
poses substantial costs upon an economy, primarily in the form of dis-
tortion of investment decisions.30 5  Securities fraud reduces
managerial accountability, increases verification costs for analysts and
others, raises liquidity costs, and distorts capital allocation.30 6 Ulti-
mately, " [i] nvestors will be reluctant to invest and trade if they believe
303 Rock, supra note 285, at 693-94. As Coffee notes, "the cost of capital appears to be
lower for firms that make fuller disclosure." John C. Coffee Jr., Racing Towards the Top?:
The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance,
102 COLUM. L. REv. 1757, 1811 (2002).
304 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 247, at 1234 ("Certainly the evidence amassed by research-
ers suggesting that capital markets are noisy markets, i.e. that stock prices do not on aver-
age reflect a security's intrinsic value, does not support subjecting investors to multiple
disclosure standards."); Prentice, supra note 85, at 1445 (noting that a regulatory regime
lacking uniform disclosure gives rise to a "Tower of Babel"); David S. Ruder, Reconciling
U.S. Disclosure Policy with International Accounting and Disclosure Standards, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 1, 10 (1996) ("It is difficult to imagine how an investor would be able to judge the
effectiveness of different regulatory regimes, much less quantify that knowledge in a man-
ner allowing the investor to change the purchasing or selling price of a particular
security.").
There is a balance to be struck because disclosure is expensive. The SEC does not
always get it right, of course. See, e.g., Randolph Beatty & Padma Kadiyala, Impact of the
Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 on the Initial Public Offering Market, 46J.L. & ECON. 517, 538
(2003) (finding that the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990's attempt to curb fraud in the
IPO market did not significantly improve issuer quality).
305 See, e.g., Tracy Yue Wang, Securities Fraud: An Economic Analysis 1 (Nov. 2004)
(unnumbered working paper), available at http://ssrn.comabstract--500562.
306 See Pritchard, supra note 11, at 937-45.
[Vol. 91:775
THE INEVITABILITY OF A STRONG SEC
that the markets are stacked against them."307 When investors refuse
to invest because they believe the markets are rigged, economic dam-
age occurs. Many proponents of market deregulation assume that in-
vestors will reduce the price they pay for securities to adjust for the
risk of being defrauded. This is not optimal either.
First, deflation of securities to account for the risk of fraud harms
firms trying to raise money. The firms cannot raise as much money,
or on as favorable terms, as they could if investors did not fear fraud.
In Russia, where meaningful securities regulation is nonexistent, in-
vestor fears that insiders will loot oil companies cause stocks to trade
at one one-hundredth of their potential value in the United States.
308
Second, deregulation harms investors because they cannot accu-
rately discount the securities they purchase to account for fraud risk.
Opponents of full disclosure suggest that investors can adjust the
price of securities based on the relative level of fraud protection in
the contract signed by the parties in a regime of private contracting,
or based on the securities laws of the state or nation where the com-
pany has opted into a regulatory competition regime. Certainly so-
phisticated investors may take these factors into account. Even
sophisticated investors may have difficulty accurately and efficiently
pricing securities in light of these signals, however.
309
There are several reasons why it is difficult for investors to adjust
the price they pay for shares to account accurately for the risk of
fraud. First, undisclosed management information is generally not
part of stock market prices. 310 Furthermore, no ready formulae exist
to discount the stock of companies that sell their shares under con-
tracts that disclaim liability for fraud, or that choose regulation by a
fraud-friendly jurisdiction. Investors and others are not sensitive to
when they are being misled.31 1 Psychological evidence indicates peo-
ple are generally insensitive to the source of information. 31 2 People
have difficulty disregarding information, even when they learn it is
307 A. C. Pritchard, Self-Regulation and Securities Markets, REGULATION, Spring 2003, at
32, 33.
308 See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 269, at 57.
309 See Prentice, supra note 215, at 1216.
310 The strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH) assumes that
such information is incorporated in the stock price, but most evidence is inconsistent with
this version of the ECMH. SeeJonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclo-
sure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 394, 417 (2004) ("Virtually no support exists for the
'strong' form of the ... ECMH.").
311 See, e.g., M. HIRsH GOLDBERG, THE BOOK OF LIEs 233-36 (1990); Bella M. DePaulo
et al., Deceiving and Detecting Deceit, in THE SELF AND SocIAL LWE 323, 343-44 (Barry R.
Schlenker ed., 1985).
312 See, e.g., DePaulo et al., supra note 311, at 327 ("[People] tend to believe whatever
affect or disposition the [communicator] is claiming, even when they know that the [com-
municator] may be deceiving.").
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from an unreliable source.313 Judgments often move in the right di-
rection, but usually not far enough. Studies in accounting show that
trained auditors tend to overweight explanations for accounting
anomalies provided by their clients, even though the auditors recog-
nize their clients' incentive to mislead.31 4 Other studies demonstrate
that when people know of their advisors' conflicts of interest, they in-
sufficiently discount that information. 315 Nicholas DiFonzo and
Prashant Bordia point out that when people recognize that the
sources of rumors about the stock market are not credible, they claim
that they are not influenced by discredited rumors, but their actual
trading activity clearly indicates that they are.
31 6
It is therefore likely that investors who know an issuer has chosen
a low-disclosure or no-fraud-protection regime will not adjust the
stock price sufficiently to account for the likelihood of fraud. Studies
show that people use information in the form provided to them;
therefore, they place more weight on express disclosures than on im-
plicit information. 31 7 When evaluating one-sided disclosures of uncer-
tain prospects, decision makers weigh the side that is disclosed more
than the side that must be inferred.318 They therefore bid higher
when the best possible outcome is disclosed, but they must infer the
313 See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuris-
tics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINY. HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 8 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (noting people's insensitivity to reliability; for example, if
given a description of a company and asked to predict its profitability, people's predictions
tend to remain the same regardless of whether they know that the information is reliable
or unreliable).
314 See Urton Anderson & Lisa Koonce, Explanation as a Method for Evaluating Client-
Suggested Causes in Analytical Procedures, AUDITING, Fall 1995, at 124, 130 (finding that audi-
tors tend to find evidence supporting causes of unexpected financial statement fluctua-
tions suggested by their clients); D. Eric Hirst & Lisa Koonce, Audit Analytical Procedures: A
Field Investigation, 13 CONTEMP. Acct. RES. 457, 474 (1996) ("[Auditors] do not normally
seek information that contradicts or refutes [client] explanations, unless information
comes to their attention indicating an explanation may not be valid.").
315 See Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Con-
flicts of Interest, 34J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (2005). Disclosure of conflicts can also increase bias
in advice because it causes the advisors to feel morally licensed and strategically en-
couraged to exaggerate their advice even more. See id. at 13-14.
316 See Nicholas DiFonzo & Prashant Bordia, Rumor and Prediction: Making Sense (but
Losing Dollars) in the Stock Market, 71 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
329, 346 (1997) ("[R]umors do not have to be believed or trusted in order to powerfully
affect trading, they simply have to make sense.").
317 SeeJOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPrvE DECISION MAKER 48, 50-52 (1993).
318 SeeJ. Richard Dietrich et al., Market Efficiency, Bounded Rationality, and Supplemental
Business Reporting Disclosures, 39 J. ACCT. REs. 243, 244 (2001) (finding that disclosure of
expected reserves by an oil company "leads to market prices that better reflect that infor-
mation as compared to situations where the same information must be inferred"); Jessen
L. Hobson & Steven J. Kachelmeier, Strategic Disclosure of Risky Prospects: A Laboratory Experi-
ment, 80 ACr. REv. 825 (2005).
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lowest possible outcome, than when the lowest possible outcome is
disclosed, but they must infer the best possible outcome.31 9
Investor reaction to securities analysts' recommendations illus-
trates these tendencies. While securities analysts clearly suffer con-
flicts of interest that render their predictions overly optimistic,
empirical studies indicate that investors do not adequately discount
for this effect. 320 There are "uncountable cases in which analyst hype
alone seems to have resulted in significant stock price movements." 321
During the dot-corn bubble, substantial, visible evidence indicated
that stock analysts were issuing false reports, but the markets did not
adequately discount their advice.3 22 Certainly unsophisticated inves-
tors would not be able to value different protective devices that issuers
might adopt.
3 23
Issuers may strategically manipulate investors in this manner, for
it works even when bidders know that disclosures are opportunistic
rather than random.3 24 Therefore, when they receive an express rep-
resentation of securities' values and must infer the implications of a
decision to register in a low-disclosure or no-fraud-protection regime,
investors tend to adjust the stock price in a downward direction, but
not enough. 325
While investors can certainly draw inferences from an issuer's de-
cision not to disclose earnings, they can draw more certain and accu-
rate inferences from actual disclosure of earnings, whether positive or
negative. Empirical studies indicate that "explicit disclosures lead to
more efficient market reactions, even when the same information can
be inferred . "..."326
Furthermore, it is extremely difficult for investors to discount
share prices to account for the risk of insider trading.3 27 Because in-
sider trading is by nature secret, with unknown volume and occur-
rence, "in actual practice, [investors] may not be able to set any
discount."3 2
8
319 See Hobson & Kachelmeier, supra note 318, at 844.
320 See Michaely & Womack, supra note 103, at 677-78.
321 Fisch & Sale, supra note 91, at 1078.
322 See Sale, supra note 107, at 406 (noting that the market did not adequately discount
even for fully disclosed risks).
323 See Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT'L. L.
815, 824-26 (2001).
324 See generally Hobson & Kachelmeier, supra note 318 (finding that users place higher
values on risky prospects when a maximum, rather than a minimum, potential outcome is
disclosed, and that the biasing effect of such one-sided disclosures is equally pronounced
when users know that the issuers are making either strategic or random disclosures).
325 See id.
326 Dietrich et al., supra note 318, at 265.
327 William KS. Wang, Selective Disclosure by Issuers, Its Legality and Ex Ante Harm: Some
Observations in Response to Professor Fox, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 869, 878 (2002).
328 Id. at 878-79.
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Ultimately, fraud is inefficient. Investors cannot adequately pro-
tect themselves by paying less for securities based on fuzzy signals sent
by companies that opt into no-liability or low-liability antifraud re-
gimes. The availability of such regimes imperils market efficiency.
b. The Improbability of Adequate Voluntary Compliance
Ideally, managers would refrain from committing fraud because
of the long-term benefits of a reputation for honesty. Unfortunately,
the same factors that often cause managers of public companies to
disclose information strategically also cause them to disclose false in-
formation. Competition for resources means that "unlawful business
conduct is a natural accompaniment of modern life."
3 2 9
Any hope that individual investors could adequately police securi-
ties fraud is naive. Individual investors, even sophisticated ones, can-
not sufficiently monitor, detect, and then remedy fraud with common
law claims for fraud or breach of contract.330 Rather, detecting many
types of fraud, such as wash sales and matched orders, "requires a cen-
tral organized detection and enforcement system such as the SEC." 33 1
McMillan agrees, noting that
[s] tock prices can be manipulated in subtle ways that would easily
escape legal prosecution but that might be controlled by a regula-
tor. Only an expert could detect insider trading carried out via
layer upon layer of transactions. A focused regulatory agency pro-
vides a more credible deterrent to financial misleading than can
overstretched courts.
33 2
c. Strong SEC Enforcement as a Solution
A strong central agency can deter and punish fraud better than
individual investors, who are largely at the mercy of fraudsters. Since
fraud victimizes even the most sophisticated investors, deregulation
seriously jeopardizes the interests of lay investors. In an unregulated
environment, gatekeepers are unreliable, and exchanges both suffer
serious conflicts of interest and lack viable enforcement mechanisms
to prevent most types of securities fraud. 333
329 Diane Vaughan, Toward Understanding Unlawful Organizational Behavior, 80 MICH. L.
REv. 1377, 1401 (1982).
330 See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 249, at 27.
331 Id. at 28.
332 MCMILLAN, supra note 226, at 177-78.
333 See Peter M. DeMarzo et al., Self-Regulation and Government Oversight, 72 REv. ECON.
STUD. 687, 702 (2005) (concluding that stock exchanges will choose less fraud enforce-
ment than customers would prefer and that the government can benefit customers by caus-
ing exchanges to enforce more aggressively); see also RAjAN & ZINGALES, supra note 269, at
160 ("[A] nother argument for why the Securities Act of 1933 'worked' is that enforcement
by the federal government was seen as more credible because it may have been seen as less
subject to capture by insiders on exchanges.").
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A strong central agency is preferable to state regulation alone.
The SEC offers a large, coordinated antifraud enforcement organiza-
tion that is more efficient and effective than the fifty states. 334 Just as
the Delaware courts are advantageous for corporate law cases because
they handle more of them than do courts in other states, the greater
experience of the federal government makes it the preferred enforcer
of securities law. Empirical studies show that a proactive agency that
can demand additional disclosure, investigate wrongdoing, and enjoin
bad actions facilitates development of financial markets.
335
Although critics may justly fault the SEC for failing to eliminate
securities fraud completely, no sensible person believes there would
be less securities fraud without the SEC. Before federal securities laws
were passed, securities fraud was widespread. Virtually every state blue
sky administrator supported federal laws to thwart that fraud.3 36 The
rigorous disclosure requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Acts helped
retard fraud,337 as did civil and criminal punishments imposed for de-
ceitful activity. Today, no state blue sky regulator would support elim-
ination of the SEC.
The current strong-SEC securities regulatory system, even with its
flaws, provides more protection for investors than any other regula-
tory regime in the world. 33 8 This protection induces investors to "play
the game, '' 33 9 thereby promoting capital market development and en-
334 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption
Failure, 22J. CoRr. L. 175, 178-79 (1997).
335 See Chenggang Xu & Katharina Pistor, Law Enforcement Under Incomplete Law: Theory
and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation 36 (Columbia Univ. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Stud-
ies, Working Paper No. 222, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=396141.
336 See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 211, at 194-200; see also Richard D. Cudahy &
William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall of
Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 93 (2005) (noting that before the federal securities laws
were enacted, companies could easily evade state blue sky laws by making offers across state
boundaries).
337 See Cox, supra note 247, at 1235 ("[E]ven... neoclassical economists... acknowl-
edge that one of the consequences of the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 was a
great reduction in the number of risky or fraudulent public offerings."); see also SELIGMAN,
supra note 1, at 562 (noting evidence that the 1933 and 1934 Acts reduced securities
fraud).
338 See Richard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a Time of
Economic Transformation, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S77, 582 (1994) ("[No] other major securi-
ties commission in the world has the power, on its own, to enforce disclosure rules and to
seek judicial sanctions against those who disobey the rules. The U.S. success rate in bring-
ing to justice companies that have chosen to ignore the requirements is dramatically better
than that of other markets around the world, and that I think contributes to [public confi-
dence in the market].").
339 See id. (noting that when investors "decide the game is rigged, they will simply
choose to go and play a different game").
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abling economic growth.340 This is particularly important in times of
crisis, when panic can cause extreme, long-lasting damage.
3 4 1
Furthermore, stringent securities laws shape morals and behav-
ior. 42 By promulgating and enforcing antifraud rules, the SEC estab-
lishes societal standards for market actors. If the SEC prohibits
insider trading, people will view it as unacceptable behavior.343 If the
SEC punishes earnings management, economic actors cannot ration-
alize it as ethically defensible.
Similarly, enforcing securities laws enhances trust among market
participants. Critics suggest that law undermines trust, but evidence
indicates that, among strangers, law can enhance trust. Would A trust
B more if B made a legally unenforceable promise or if B made a
promise and A could sue him if he lied? The best evidence points to
the latter.3
44
Goshen and Parchomovsky point out:
Like mandatory disclosure duties, restrictions on fraud and manipu-
lation also create a virtuous cycle. By reducing information traders'
340 See McMiLLAN, supra note 226, at 179 ("Where shareholder safeguards are less
strict, there is a dampening of willingness to invest. . . . [Empirical studies show that
c]ountries with strong investor protections have bigger capital markets. The efficacy of the
stock market varies with how activist the government is in setting the platform.").
341 See Karmel, supra note 179, at 544-45 ("The theory that regulatory competition
produces the most efficient regulatory structure is based on principles of economics that
fail to sufficiently take into account the psychological factors affecting investor confidence.
... The reason securities regulation became a matter of federal concern is that there was a
need to increase investor confidence in order to generate capital formation in the
1930s."); Cindy Skrzycki, Collapse Shakes Core of Confidence in Economy, WASH. POST, Oct. 25,
1987, at A18 ("Business historian Thomas K. McCraw of the Harvard Business School
pointed out that the underpinnings of the economy in 1929 were in some ways stronger
than they are today: New industries were taking hold and growing and the government was
running a surplus. The depression that followed the crash came because the institutional
and regulatory safety net that exists today was not in place to avoid a panic.").
342 See THOMAS DONALDSON & THoMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL CON-
TRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS 95 (1999) ("Law, particularly when it is perceived as
legitimate by members of a community, may have a major impact on what is considered to
be correct behavior."); Fairfax, supra note 57, at 445 (noting that legal opinions define
acceptable conduct and thereby help set norms for behavior); Richard H. Pildes, The Unin-
tended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REv.
936, 938-39 (1991) (noting that law has cultural consequences); Eric A. Posner, Law, Eco-
nomics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1731 (1996) ("[Llaws inevitably
strengthen or weaken social norms by signaling an official stance toward them . . .");
Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct 64 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr.
for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 340, 2001), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/abstract=293905 (noting that "legal rules can affect our moral beliefs as well
as the operation of the moral sanctions").
343 See Prentice, supra note 85, at 1503 ("When the SEC bans manipulation and insider
trading, 'financial morality' similarly evolves.").
344 See Angela L. Coletti et al., The Effect of Control Systems on Trust and Cooperation in
Collaborative Environments, 80 Acr. REv. 477, 478 (2004) (finding that control systems in-
duce cooperation which, in turn, positively affects trust, rather than undermining it as has
been argued).
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precaution costs, restrictions on fraud and manipulation facilitate
entry into the information traders market and thus increase compe-
tition among information traders. The enhanced competition will,
in turn, increase the probability of detecting misstatements and
fraud, and thereby reduce the incentive for corporations to engage
in fraud or manipulation. The reduced incentive to release mis-
leading information to the market will further decrease information
traders' precaution costs, and so on.
34 5
Empirical evidence thus supports mandatory disclosure rules. It
also indicates that antifraud rules,
346 insider trading prohibitions,
34 7
private antifraud enforcement,3 48 and even corporate governance pro-
45 Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 249, at 29. Goshen and Parchomovsky empha-
size the role that securities analysts play in our markets, noting that "by protecting informa-
tion traders, securities regulation represents the highest form of market integrity, which
ensures accurate pricing ... to all investors. In this way, securities regulation improves the
allocation of resources in the economy." Id. at 6.
346 See D. Paul Newman et al., The Role of Auditing in Investor Protection, 80 Accr. REV.
289, 300 (2005) indicating that "in markets that provide greater investor protections
through [auditor and insider] penalties, total investment levels in new ventures are greater
and firm ownership is less concentrated").
347 See Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Compara-
tive Evidence, 7 Am. L. & EcoN. REV. 144, 144 (2005) ("[C]ountries with more prohibitive
insider trading laws have more diffuse equity ownership, more accurate stock prices, and more
liquid stock markets."); Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trad-
ing, 57J. FIN. 75, 75 (2002) ("We find that the cost of equity in a country, after controlling
for a number of other variables, does not change after the introduction of insider trading
laws, but decreases significantly after the first prosecution."); Robert M. Bushman et al.,
Insider Trading Restrictions and Analysts' Incentives to Follow Firms, 60 J. FIN. 35, 35 (2005)
(finding that analyst coverage of firms increases following enforcement of insider trading
laws, especially in developing countries); Laura N. Beny, Do Shareholders Value Insider Trad-
ing Laws? International Evidence 34 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law Econ. & Bus., Discus-
sion Paper No. 345, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrnh.com/abstract=296111 (finding
that investors do value insider trading legislation, especially when ownership and control
are separated); Coffee, supra note 303, at 1828 ("The available empirical evidence suggests
that adopting and enforcing a prohibition against insider trading significantly reduces the
cost of capital. Such a finding is consistent with [substantial empirical evidence adduced
by La Porta and his colleagues, as well as others,] that strong laws protecting minority
investors are a precondition to financial development.").
348 See La Porta et al., supra note 192 (finding that effective private securities litigation
enforcement is positively correlated with more developed capital markets). Indeed, La
Porta et al.'s study found that private litigation enforcement was more important than
public enforcement, particularly in less-developed nations unlikely to have a strong central
agency. See id. Even in the United States, the number of private actions exceeds the num-
ber of SEC actions. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Structuring Securities Regulation in the
European Union: Lessons from the US. Experience 31 (European Corporate Governance Inst.,
Law Working Paper No. 41/2005, 2005; Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Pub. Law Research
Paper No. 624582, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=624582. Nevertheless, "the
two forms of enforcement often complement each other." Erik Bergl6f & Stijn Claessens,
Corporate Governance and Enforcement 41 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No.
3409, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=625286.
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visions protecting minority shareholders from exploitation 349 serve to
strengthen capital markets and encourage economic development.
In sum, share price accuracy and financial liquidity determine
market efficiency. Mandatory disclosure and antifraud provisions
both contribute to share price accuracy and because both decrease
costs and increase fairness for parties participating in capital markets,
they also improve liquidity. As Black notes, "It's magical, in a way.
People pay enormous amounts of money for completely intangible




The strong-SEC model works. There is a consensus among state
and federal regulators, legitimate issuers, and respected members of
the securities industry regarding the desirability of the "disclosure
good and fraud bad" meta-script.351 Legitimate issuers and honest se-
curities professionals do not wish to be deregulated, except at the
margin.
352
The same empirical evidence that emphatically supports
mandatory full disclosure, antifraud enforcement, insider trading pro-
hibition, and corporate governance reform has helped the American
theory of regulation spread around the world. Although the heavy-
349 SeeJere R. Francis et al., The Role of Accounting and Auditing in Corporate Governance
and the Development of Financial Markets Around the World, 10 ASIA-PAc. J. Acc-r. & ECON. 1, 3
(2003) (finding that accounting standards are more transparent and disclosures more
timely in countries with strong protections for minority investors); Simon Johnson et al.,
Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PRoc.) 22, 26 (2000) (finding that legal protection
of minority shareholders promotes overall economic development); Bernard S. Black et
al., Does Corporate Governance Affect Firm Value?: Evidence from Korea, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
(forthcoming 2006) (finding that higher levels of corporate governance protection among
South Korean firms increased their valuation); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and
Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002) (finding that common law jurisdictions' legal
protections for minority shareholders increase firms' valuations); Christian Leuz et al., In-
vestor Protection and Earnings Management: An International Comparison (MIT Sloan Sch. Of
Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4225-01, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =281832.
350 Bernard S. Black, Information Asymmetry, the Internet, and Securities Offerings, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 91, 92-93 (1998); see also Bergl6f & Claessens, supra note 348, at
29 (surveying the empirical literature and concluding that " [o] nly a combination of strong
investor rights and an efficient judicial system leads to well-developed financial markets").
351 See Langevoort, supra note 348, at 10. Ronald Chen and Jon Hanson use the term
"meta-script" in referring to the structure underlying policymaking. Ronald Chen & Jon
Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103
MICH. L. REv. 1 (2004).
352 Langevoort explains:
After all, most securities regulation is just a solution to the economists' lem-
ons problem, and firms (both issuers and those in the securities industry)
on the more legitimate end of the scale appreciate a mechanism that helps
separates [sic] out the lemons from the rest of the fruit. Investor confi-
dence generates wealth for those who supply the relevant goods.
Langevoort, supra note 348, at 10-11.
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handed extraterritorial application of Sarbanes-Oxley causes Euro-
pean and Asian companies and countries to grouse about American
securities law, those companies and countries have for years been
moving toward the American strong-SEC model. Although the con-
vergence will likely never be complete because of cultural differences
and path dependence, the trend will inevitably continue.
353
a. A Central Agency
In recent years, every EU member has created its own version of
the SEC, not because of requirements, but because of the obvious suc-
cess of American capital markets operating under the SEC's protective
umbrella. 354 The United Kingdom has created the Financial Services
Authority (FSA),355 Germany the Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleis-
tungsaufsicht (BaFin) ,356 France the Autorit6 des Marches Financiers
(AMF) ,357 and Spain the Comisi6n Nacional del Mercado de Valores
(CNMV) .35  Asian nations have followed suit. For example, China
353 Even the most controversial provision of Sarbanes-Oxley, section 404's expensive
rules on internal financial controls, were serving as the model for contemplated Japanese
reform in December 2004, after that country's version of the SEC found that one in ten
listed companies had provided false financial statements. See David Ibison & BarneyJop-
son, Deceit Revealed in Japanese Companies, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at 12. Furthermore,
anticipating section 404, the U.K's Hampel Committee and Cadbury Committee both sug-
gested that boards of directors should evaluate their firms' systems of internal control and
risk management. See Cynthia A. Williams &John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way?: The
Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493 (2005); see
also Peggy Hollinger, French Call for Common Standards Governance, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005,
at 16 (noting that the French stock market regulator recently advocated a common Euro-
pean internal control standard); Bruce Zagaris, European Commission Proposal on Corporate
and Financial Malpractice, Irr'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., Jan. 2005, at 6 (noting that in re-
sponse to the Parmalat and other scandals, the Commission of the European Communities
recommended new initiatives to strengthen internal financial controls along the lines of
section 404).
354 See CHARLES R. MORRIS, MONEY, GREED, AND RISK: WHY FINANCIAL CRISES AND
CRASHES HAPPEN 78 (1999) ("The securities regulatory system that evolved through the
1930s ... has proven itself the most successful in the world.").
355 See SPENCER, supra note 87, at 40 (noting that the British system is similar to the U.S.
regulatory regime); Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities
and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOL J.
INT'L L. 319 (2003) (comparing and contrasting strong regulators).
356 See Rosa M. Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in
Europe, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49, 51 (2003) (discussing the creation of BaFin).
357 See W Paul Bishop, Recent Developments in Corporate Governance Practices in France, in
INT'L FIN. L. REV., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 97, 97-101 (describing the circumstances of
AMF's creation); Samer Iskandar, FN Financial Profile: Michel Prada, AMF Chairman, Keeps
France on the Road to Radical Reform, FIN. NEWS ONLINE, Oct. 25, 2004 (noting that AMF's
chair believes its structure is most similar to that of the United States' SEC).
358 See Samuel Wolff, Implementation of International Disclosure Standards, 22 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L., 91, 98 n.39 (2001).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
has created the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 3 5
Japan the Financial Services Agency (FSA),360 and South Korea the
Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC).361
The world investor community has found persuasive evidence
that a central authority, such as the SEC, reduces financing costs for
issuers by providing more credibility to a market than could exist if
private parties negotiated disclosure or securities exchanges alone reg-
ulated it. Central agencies are particularly important outside the
United States because other nations' private enforcement mecha-
nisms are not as effective as the United States'.3 62 Additionally, Euro-
pean regulators and the SEC are working together to further the
convergence of European and U.S. securities regulation.
363
b. Mandatory Disclosure
The United States and the United Kingdom have long required
full disclosure because share ownership of public companies is more
widely dispersed 364 than in other nations. Nonetheless, even in na-
tions with more concentrated ownership structures, lawmakers value
mandatory disclosure because it minimizes the illicit diversion of cor-
porate assets by controlling shareholders and promotes competition
against established firms.
3 65
Even before Sarbanes-Oxley, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) studied corporate governance
issues. 366 In 1999, the OECD adopted principles that recommended
U.S.-style mandatory corporate disclosure.3 67 The EU nations realize
359 See Jiangyu Wang, Dancing with Wolves: Regulation and Deregulation of Foreigu Invest-
ment in China's Stock Market, 5 ASLAN-PAc. L. & POL'YJ. 1, 8-9 (2004), http://www.hawaii.
edu/aplpj/pdfs/v5-01-Wang.pdf (discussing the CSRC and the issues it faces).
360 See Markham, supra note 355, at 320.
361 See Karen Harris, Anticipatory Regulation for the Management of Banking Crises, 38
COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS., 251, 271 (2005).
362 See Gerard Hertig, Convergence of Substantive Law and Convergence of Enforcement, A
Comparison, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 328, 332 (Jeffrey
N. Gordon & MarkJ. Roe eds., 2004) (noting thatJapan and the EU nations are emulating
a strong-SEC model "because mandating transparency is considered to be ineffective if
enforcement is left to private parties").
363 See Ian Bickerton, SEC and CESR to Work Together, FIN. TIMES, June 5, 2004, at 8.
364 See Ferrell, supra note 222, at 11.
365 See id. at 19-25.
366 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://www.oecd.
org/home (last visited Feb. 19, 2006).
367 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., AD. Hoc TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE
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that "[r]obust, comparable and transparent financial information is
fundamental to the successful operation" of EU markets. 368
Although some important differences remain in the details, there
has been a convergence in recent years, and "it seems that the capital
markets and regulation are inexorably pressing European and Japa-
nese companies toward the U.S.-U.K. model of financial reporting." 369
Both the reach and the scope of mandatory disclosure requirements
in primary and secondary markets around the world are already
broadly similar to the U.S. model.370 This is true not only of initial
and continuous reporting, but also of reporting in extraordinary
transactions, such as tender offers.
371
Traditionally, significant accounting differences among jurisdic-
tions have dramatically affected the accuracy and reliability of re-
quired financial reporting. 372  While meaningful accounting
differences remain, all major jurisdictions are moving toward the An-
glo-Saxon accounting model to provide improved accuracy, compara-
bility, and meaningfulness to investors and creditors. 373
368 Ian P. Dewing & Peter 0. Russell, Accounting, Auditing and Corporate Governance of
European Listed Countries: EU Policy Developments Before and After Enron, 42 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 289, 289 (2004).
369 Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Creditor Protection, in ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW,
supra note 228, at 71, 82; see also Manuel P Barrocas, Portugal's Answer to Sarbanes-Oxley, INT'L
FIN. L. REV., May 2003, at 57, 57 (noting Portugal's 1999 Capital Market Act that imposed
new disclosure requirements with attendant penalties for disobedience).
370 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, in
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 362, at 33, 53 (not-
ing that "majorjurisdictions outside of the US are reinforcing their disclosure systems" and
that "the subject matter of mandatory disclosure for public companies is startlingly similar
across the major commercial jurisdictions today"); Hertig, supra note 362, at 332 ("There is
now an EU law framework with transparency requirements that are becoming increasingly
similar to those in the US-a trend that should be reinforced by post-Enron regulatory
reforms.").
371 See Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW,
supra note 228, at 157, 175 ("[A] centerpiece of all takeover regulation [in major nations]
... is an elaborate set of provisions mandating disclosure by both the target board and the
acquirer for the benefit of target shareholders.").
372 Rajan and Zingales note that in Germany, until at least recently, "misleading inves-
tors is not an aberration but a tenet of policy." RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 269, at 250.
They provide the well-known example of Daimler-Benz, which in 1998 merged with
Chrysler Corporation to form DaimlerChrysler. In 1993, Daimler-Benz showed a half-year
profit of DM 168 million according to German accounting standards; that profit changed
to a DM 949 million loss when the company had to conform to GAAP in order to list with
the NYSE. See id. at 250-51.
373 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 370, at 53 (noting that "uniform accounting
standards are rapidly crystallizing" into two sets of well-defined standards, American GAAP
and the International Accounting Standards (LAS) and that these two standards will proba-
bly converge further "if only because of the economic savings that would result from a
single set of global accounting standards"); Hertig et al., supra note 228, at 201-02. Al-
though EU and Japanese accounting remains slightly more opaque than U.S.-U.K. stan-
dards, "pressure from the international capital market, and the desire to access the U.S.
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c. Strong Antifraud Rules
Most developed nations have recently adopted new or stronger
antifraud rules and have strengthened means of enforcement.37 4 For
example, the EC Public Offer Prospectus Directive of 1989 required
member nations to adopt a system of mandatory disclosure for public
offerings and punishment for misrepresentations analogous to those
that the Securities Act of 1933 addressed in the United States. 375 In
the last decade or so, Germany has expanded regulators' authority
and reduced impediments to misled investors bringing lawsuits.
376
Several European nations have begun studying American-style class ac-
tions as a means to protect shareholders and consumers. 377 Japan,
China, Korea, and other Asian nations have also adopted U.S.-style
securities fraud statutes and strengthened shareholder rights.
3 7 8 Simi-
larly, all major nations regulate their capital markets and attendant
institutions, such as stock exchanges and stock brokerage firms.3 7 9
EU nations are even considering strengthening private enforcement
in order to support the centralized agencies they have established.
380
Overall, transnational studies indicate a strong correlation be-
tween the maturity and size of capital markets and the aggressiveness
with which they protect investors. Therefore, as EU and other mar-




equity market in particular, have forced the largest EU and Japanese firms to adopt ac-
counting practices that are comparable to those used by U.S. firms." Id. at 202.
374 Hertig et al., supra note 228, at 211 (noting that negligence and antifraud
"[s]tandards backed by the potential for large damage awards are important in every re-
gime of securities regulation").
375 David B. Guenther, Note, The Limited Public Offer in German and U.S. Securities Law: A
Comparative Analysis of Prospectus Act Section 2(2) and Rule 505 of Regulation D, 20 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 871, 927-28 (1999) (noting the "fundamental commonalities" between the 1933
Securities Act and Germany's Prospectus Act passed in response to the EC's Public Offer
Prospectus Directive).
376 See Peter M. Memminger, The New German Insider Law: Introduction and Discussion in
Relation to United States Securities Law, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 189, 193-94 (1996).
377 See Brendan Malkin, UK Firms Gear Up as Class Action Culture Hits Europe, THE LAW-
YER, Feb. 7, 2005, at 72, 72 (noting that Sweden, Germany, France, and the Netherlands are
all studying class actions, and Russia and the Ukraine are "getting their first taste of multi-
party disputes").
378 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black et al., Shareholder Suits and Outside Director Liability: The
Case of Korea (Stanford Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 47/2005, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=628223 (detailing South Korea's
reforms, including the facilitation of securities class action lawsuits).
379 See Hertig et al., supra note 228, at 193.
380 See Hertig, supra note 362, at 332-33.
381 See Hertig et al., supra note 228, at 213 (noting that "[s] trikingly, the aggressiveness
of the legal regimes of investor protection seems roughly to match the size and maturity of
national capital markets.").
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d. Insider Trading Prohibitions
Within roughly the past fifteen years, EU members, Japan, China,
and other countries have prohibited insider trading in similar circum-
stances and on substantially the same grounds as the United States.
38 2
As arguments favoring the efficiency of insider trading rang increas-
ingly hollow,3 83 appeals to fairness sharpened, 384 and empirical evi-
dence demonstrated that bans on insider trading strengthened the
performance of capital markets, 385 international acceptance of insider
trading waned. There is a burgeoning international consensus that
the inherent unfairness of insider trading undermines the integrity of
securities markets and discourages regular investors from playing what
they perceive as a loaded game.
38 6
A key development evidencing this emerging consensus was the
1989 EU Council Directive mandating that member states enact spe-
cific rules to curb insider trading activities.38 7 Germany, desiring to
improve its securities markets and make them more inviting to lay in-
vestors, drove this change.388 Among EU nations, only France and the
United Kingdom had preexisting insider trading regimes of any signif-
icance. 38 9 The Directive was patterned, however, more on American
law than on either the French or British rules. By the turn of the
millennium, virtually all developed nations had enacted U.S.-style in-
sider trading laws and enforcement actions in the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, China, Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere were no
longer rare.390
382 See Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Related Party Transactions, in ANATOMY OF CORPO-
RATE LAw, supra note 228, at 101, 113 ("[A]ll majorjurisdictions now impose some kind of
direct ban on insider trading on the basis of non-public information about the value of
issuer securities."); Amir N. Licht, International Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on
the Way to Convergence, 20 CARozo L. REV. 227, 233 (1998) (noting that the SEC and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions have brought about a convergence
of insider trading regulation based on the U.S. model).
383 See, e.g., Mark Klock, Are Wastefulness and Flamboyance Really Virtues? Uses and Abuse of
Economic Analysis, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 181, 247-48 (2002) (refuting arguments that insider
trading is efficient and beneficial).
384 See Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 119 (arguing
that economic rationales for insider trading have not successfully refuted the importance
of fairness arguments); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider
Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375 (1999) (providing a rational justification for banning insider
trading based on a deontological moral principle).
385 See supra note 347.
386 See SHEN-SHIN Lu, INSIDER TRADING AND THE TwENTY-FouR HOUR SECURITIES MAR-
KET: A CASE STUDY OF LEGAL REGULATION IN THE EMERGING GLOBAL ECONOMY 17-21 (1999)
(noting the unfair advantage insider trading provides insiders).
387 See Memminger, supra note 376, at 193-94.
388 See id.
389 See id.
390 See, e.g., German Authorities Suspect Insider Trading of Medion Shares, BORSEN-ZEITUNG,
Dec. 24, 2004 (noting a new German investigation into insider trading); Messier in Jail for
Vivendi Fraud Probe, TAIWAN NEWS, June 23, 2004 (noting that former high-flying French
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Without question, nations around the world are moving inexora-
bly toward the American strong-SEC model.391 For political reasons,
they cannot appear happy about it. They must grumble about Ameri-
can legal imperialism. 392 Yet the strong-SEC system works, as the
United States' economy demonstrates. Because these nations wish to
attract capital, develop their securities markets, and strengthen their
economies, they must emulate the United States,3 93 and to a lesser
degree, the United Kingdom. 394 While, for reasons of path depen-
dence and cultural diversity, the convergence will never be complete,
the convergence is already quite substantial.
CONCLUSION
In the end, the key question is not whether the government is
preferable to the market as an allocator of capital and resources. In
that contest, the market easily wins. The relevant question is whether
the government can, with the right tools, make securities markets
more efficient than they would be without governmental assistance.
Two competing theories address this question. One vision relies
on market participants, including issuing companies, managers, direc-
tors, auditors, stockbrokers, stock analysts, and others, to advance
businessman Jean-Marie Messier was in jail under suspicion of insider trading in Vivendi
stock); Spanish Regulator Opens Inquiry into Insider Trading in Adeasa Prior to Autogrill Takeover
Bid, IL SOLE, Feb. 3, 2005 (noting a new Spanish investigation into insider trading); Mariko
Sanchanta, Tsutsumi Faces Tough Sentence, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at 28 (noting that
Yoshiaki Tsutsumi, formerly the world's richest man, had pled guilty to insider trading
charges in Japan). This is not to say that such prosecutions are yet commonplace in these
nations. They are not.
391 This discussion should make clear that the convergence is not entirely one-way.
For example, the SEC is seriously considering moving toward the principles-based account-
ing system more popular in the EU and away from the rules-based system currently used in
the United States.
More importantly, at the big-picture level it is very likely that the United States will
move more toward the EU model in the area of corporate social reporting (CSR). Because
investors as well as others are taking an increasingly broader view of the responsibilities of
corporations, American firms will have to catch up to European firms in CSR. See Cynthia
A. Williams and John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way?: The Erosion of the Anglo-American
Shareholder Value Construct (UNC Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 04-09, 2004), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=632347 (making this argument and showing that the United
Kingdom may be setting the new trend).
392 Karmel notes: "It would appear that the reaction of foreign issuers to Sarbanes-
Oxley is following a familiar pattern-vigorous protest by foreign issuers to being subjected
to new SEC regulations, followed by responsive actions by foreign regulators to impose
some of the new standards, likely to lead to accommodations by both the foreign issuer
community and the SEC to a new regime." Roberta S. Karmel, The Securities and Exchange
Commission Goes Abroad to Regulate Corporate Governance, 33 STETSON L. REv. 849 (2004).
393 See Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations, 94 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
2006) (noting that competition for investment is forcing European nations to reform their
corporate governance along lines consistent with the U.S. system).
394 See id. at 51 (noting that EU nations are using "Anglo-American corporate law as a
reference point").
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their long-term reputational interests by acting rationally. In this vi-
sion, managers voluntarily bond themselves to the market by disclos-
ing optimal amounts of information, subjecting themselves to
securities fraud and insider trading liability, and embracing corporate
governance best practices. Auditors seldom act recklessly. Stock ana-
lysts burnish their reputations by recommending only the stocks they
believe in and forfeiting any opportunity to garner investment bank-
ing revenue for their employers, even if it would mean greater gain in
the short run.
The other story recognizes the unavoidable agency problem and
addresses the problem with two simple rules: Mandatory disclosure is
good and fraud is bad. Required disclosure produces more informa-
tion than voluntary disclosure ever has or would. The mandatory fea-
ture allows quality firms to signal their quality and avoid the "market
for lemons" problem. Punishing fraud promotes both fairness and
efficiency values. Investors therefore feel confident investing.
The best empirical evidence strongly supports the second theory.
Around the world, governments interested in enlarging their econo-
mies and strengthening their capital markets embrace the strong-SEC
model by creating central securities agencies. These governments
both charge such agencies with enforcing mandatory disclosure rules,
antifraud proscriptions, and insider trading prohibitions, and supple-
ment the agencies' resources with private enforcement provisions.
The best evidence available indicates that this is the future of securi-
ties regulation.
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